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STEVEN S. GENSLER*
Diversity Class Actions, Common
Relief, and the Rule of Individual
Valuation
The amount in controversy requirement has proved to be aformidable barrier to bringing state law class actions in fed-
eral court under diversity jurisdiction.1  In the late 1960s and
early 1970s, the Supreme Court dealt what has been described as
a “crippling blow”2 to the diversity class action when it inter-
preted the diversity statute to require that all class members indi-
vidually satisfy the amount in controversy requirement, without
regard to the aggregate value of the class claim.3  As a result, vast
numbers of multi-million dollar state law class actions—including
virtually all state law consumer class actions—have been rele-
gated to the state courts because the individual class members’
claims amount to only a few hundred or thousand dollars each.4
* Associate Professor, University of Oklahoma College of Law.  I would like to
thank Tom Mengler, Jim Pfander, and Patrick Woolley for their comments on a
previous draft.  I also thank Stephanie Schadle and Nick Merkley for their research
assistance.
1 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000).
2 See  Frank L. Maraist & T. Page Sharp, After  Snyder v. Harris:  Whither Goes the
Spurious Class Action? , 41 MISS. L.J. 379, 379 (1970) (describing Snyder  as a “crip-
pling blow” to diversity class actions); Brian Mattis & James S. Mitchell, The Trouble
with Zahn:  Progeny of Snyder v. Harris Further Cripples Class Actions , 53 NEB. L.
REV. 137, 194 (1974) (“The Zahn  decision dealt a crippling blow to [the] use of class
actions as a means for redress of small claims in the federal courts.”).
3 See  Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969); Int’l Paper Co. v. Zahn, 414 U.S. 291
(1973); see also infra  notes 71-78 and accompanying text (discussing in detail the
collective jurisdictional impact of Snyder  and Zahn).
4 See  Deborah R. Hensler et al., Class Action Dilemmas: Pursuing Public Goals
for Private Gain 73 (2000) [hereinafter RAND/ICJ STUDY].  As one commentator
explains, “as a general matter, class actions are brought when individual claims are
so low that the likelihood of individual suits is small.  Thus, prohibiting aggregation
of claims in class actions effectively excludes the large majority of such actions from
diversity jurisdiction.”  Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Bus-
iness Between State and Federal Courts:  Federal Jurisdiction and “The Martian
Chronicles ,” 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1806-07 (1992); see also  Lloyd C. Anderson, The
[295]
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During the 1990s, creative litigants—usually defendants seeking
a basis for removal5—began exploring new ways to argue that
class claims satisfied the amount in controversy requirement.  In-
itially, it looked like the diversity class action might find new life
through a long-standing but little used exception to the rule
against aggregate valuation.  Specifically, while Snyder  and Zahn
rejected the idea of valuing class actions in the aggregate claims
just because they were class actions, both decisions reaffirmed
the traditional rule of valuing joined parties’ claims in the aggre-
gate when they “unite to enforce a single title or right in which
they have a common and undivided interest.”6  Latching onto
this concept, litigants began arguing that, while Snyder  and Zahn
precluded routine aggregate valuation of compensatory damages
American Law Institute Proposal to Bring Small-Claim State-Law Class Actions
Within Federal Jurisdiction:  An Affront to Federalism That Should Be Rejected , 35
CREIGHTON L. REV. 325, 331 (2002) (“The practical effect of the Zahn  decision was
to eliminate small-claim state-law class actions from federal court.”); Gary Igal
Strausberg, Class Actions and Jurisdictional Amount:  Access to a Federal Forum—A
Post Snyder v. Harris Analysis , 22 AM. U. L. REV. 79, 94 (1972) (asserting that
Snyder  “virtually closed the federal forum” to consumer class actions).
5 See  Christopher J. Willis, Aggregation of Punitive Damages in Diversity Class
Actions:  Will the Real Amount in Controversy Please Stand Up? , 30 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 775, 775 (1997) (noting that removal has generated most of the recent class
action valuation litigation).  This reflects an intriguing shift in litigant preference.
When the Supreme Court issued Snyder , the plaintiffs’ bar and consumer groups
lamented the loss of the federal forum, reflecting the prevailing sentiment that state
courts were inhospitable to class actions. See  Mattis & Mitchell, supra  note 2, at 172
(articulating the “inescapable conclusion that state courts have been hostile to [Rule
23(b)(3)] class actions”); see also  Burt A. Leete, The Right of Consumers to Bring
Class Actions in the Federal Courts—An Analysis of Possible Approaches , 33 U.
PITT. L. REV. 39, 41 (1971) (describing ineffectiveness of state class action rules and
remedies).  To their surprise, however, state court class actions flourished as the
states enacted new class action procedures and adopted class action friendly doc-
trines. See RAND/ICJ SURVEY, supra  note 4, at 73; see also  Anderson, supra  note 4,
at 355 (“Experience with state court class actions in the quarter century since Zahn
demonstrates that state judges have proven quite receptive to class actions.”); Note,
Multistate Plaintiff Class Actions:  Jurisdiction and Certification , 92 HARV. L. REV.
718, 718 (1979) (“[T]he nine years since Snyder  have seen the widespread moderni-
zation of state class action practice.”).  Now, defendants view federal court as a ha-
ven from what they perceive as abusively lenient certification practices in state
court. See  Victor E. Schwartz et al., Federal Courts Should Decide Interstate Class
Actions:  A Call for Federal Class Action Diversity Jurisdiction Reform , 37 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 483, 499 (2000) (“Unlike the scrupulous practice of federal judges, some
state judges have taken laissez-faire attitudes toward class certification.”). But see
Linda S. Mullenix, Abandoning the Federal Class Action Ship:  Is There Smoother
Sailing for Class Actions in Gulf Waters? , 74 TUL. L. REV. 1709, 1778 (2000) (noting
conservative approach developing in Texas, but not necessarily in the other gulf
states).
6 See Zahn , 414 U.S. at 294; Snyder , 394 U.S. at 335.
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claims, they did not control the valuation of other forms of class
claims or relief.  Specifically, litigants argued that, when sought
on behalf of a class, certain types of claims—punitive damages,
attorneys’ fees, injunctive relief, and restitution—inherently sat-
isfied the common and undivided interest rule because the relief
they sought would benefit the group as a whole, rather than indi-
vidual class members.7  Under this theory, the amount in contro-
versy requirement would be satisfied whenever the class sought
total punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, injunctive relief, or resti-
tution of more than $75,000.  Needless to say, this would be a lot
of cases.
It almost worked.  A few early cases agreed that the common
and undivided interest exception was met when the suit sought
relief that would benefit the class as a group.8  Almost immedi-
ately thereafter, though, the federal courts abandoned the relief-
based approach in favor of the much narrower rights-based stan-
dard already in use for compensatory damage claims:  Prior to
the filing of the class action, did the class members hold jointly
the substantive rights underlying the class claim for relief?9  The
difference in the result between a relief-based and a rights-based
test is hard to overstate:  Whereas many remedies will benefit a
class as a group, few claims spring from jointly-held rights.10
Once a court concludes that the rights underlying a class claim
are separate and distinct (and therefore non-aggregable), how-
ever, it then must calculate an amount in controversy for each
class member.11  But the same characteristics that make class
claims for punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, injunctive relief, and
restitution appear “common and undivided” for aggregation pur-
poses also make them difficult to value on a per class member
basis.  Class claims for injunctive relief, for example, yield a sin-
gle benefit, but it is a benefit that inures to all class members.
Class claims for punitive damages and restitutionary disgorge-
7 Snyder , 394 U.S. at 335; see also Zahn , 414 U.S. at 294 (“[W]hen several plain-
tiffs unite to enforce a single title or right, in which they have a common and undi-
vided interest, it is enough if their interests collectively equal the jurisdictional
amount.”) (quoting Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & Co. , 222 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1911)).
8 See infra  notes 79-88 and accompanying text.
9 See infra  notes 89-102 and accompanying text.
10 See  15 MARTIN H. REDISH, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 102.100 (3d ed.
2002) [hereinafter 15 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE] (“Because very few claims will
be deemed joint, multiple plaintiffs will not often be permitted to aggregate their
claims.”).
11 See Zahn , 414 U.S. at 301.
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ment seek money, but the purpose of it is to deter and punish
misconduct and to take away ill-gotten gains, not as loss compen-
sation.  Thus, they create a pool of money—based on characteris-
tics of the defendant—in an amount that may be indifferent to
the number of claimants who eventually will divide the spoils.
Class claims for attorneys’ fees exhibit the greatest range of com-
mon characteristics.  Everybody benefits from the work of the
class lawyers, but the cost of that work is not a linear multiple of
the size of the class.
This Article addresses the valuation of class action claims that
seek common relief.  Part I provides a general foundation by set-
ting forth the basic rules for calculating the amount in contro-
versy in a diversity case, paying special attention to valuation in
diversity class actions.12  Part II recounts how the adoption of a
strict rights-based definition of what constitutes a common and
undivided interest has led the federal courts to reject aggregate
valuation of most class claims for common relief.13  Part III fol-
lows by detailing the various techniques courts have devised to
calculate “per class member” values for those claims.14
Part IV provides a critical analysis of those valuation tech-
niques.  After re-examining the fundamentals of multi-party
claim valuation, Part IV determines that the dominant principle
is that the value of any plaintiff’s claim, regardless of party struc-
ture, is what the value would have been had that plaintiff sued on
his own—the rule of individual valuation.15  From that reference
point, Part IV returns to the existing common relief valuation
techniques.  As Part IV explains, many of the techniques courts
currently use to value class claims for injunctive relief and resti-
tution are best understood as applications of the rule of individ-
ual valuation.16  However, the valuation techniques courts most
commonly use to value class claims for punitive damages and at-
torneys’ fees fail to honor the rule of individual valuation, and in
doing so may be systematically undervaluing those claims.17
Part V attempts to identify what the rule of individual valua-
12 See infra notes 18-78 and accompanying text.
13 See infra  notes 79-139 and accompanying text.
14 See infra  notes 140-98 and accompanying text.
15 See infra  notes 199-221 and accompanying text.  Indeed, the so-called aggrega-
tion rules can be seen as an application of this principle, rather than an exception to
it. See infra  notes 206-14 and accompanying text.
16 See infra  notes 259-73 and accompanying text.
17 See infra  notes 230-58 and accompanying text.
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tion might teach us about the current state of claim valuation.
Viewed narrowly, the rule of individual valuation shows that the
current valuation scheme denies a federal forum to otherwise de-
serving litigants.  The larger lesson, however, is that the rule of
individual valuation provides a valuable insight into many of the
unresolved solo plaintiff valuation questions that lay concealed
by existing class action valuation methods.  In other words, a rule
of individual valuation analysis reveals that many of the valua-
tion problems believed to stem from improper aggregation in fact
derive from even thornier—and much more fundamental—ques-
tions about how to value certain forms of relief generally.
Part VI then turns to the topic of jurisdictional reform.  First, it
considers how plaintiffs might use and adapt loopholes in re-
moval practice to blunt the jurisdictional impact of the rule of
individual valuation.  Thus, meaningful implementation of the
rule of individual valuation might require coordinated reform of
the removal statute.  Second, Part VI addresses the relationship
between the rule of individual valuation and recurrent legislative
efforts to comprehensively reform class action jurisdiction.
I
THE AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY REQUIREMENT
Article III of the United States Constitution extends the fed-
eral judicial power to controversies between citizens of different
states.18  Article III power lies dormant, however, until Congress
taps into it.19  The First Congress did so almost immediately,20
authorizing federal court diversity suits in the Judiciary Act of
1789 but limiting that jurisdiction to civil suits “where the matter
in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five
hundred dollars. . . .”21  Since then, Congress has recodified the
18 U.S. CONST. art. III, § l, cl. 2.
19 Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 548 (1989); see also  13B CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3601, at 343 (2d ed. 1984)
[hereinafter 13B FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE] (“[C]ountless decisions
recogniz[e] that the grant of jurisdiction is permissive rather than mandatory, and
subject to the discretion of Congress rather than self-executing.”).
20 As noted in Charles Warren’s influential history of the Judiciary Act of 1789, “it
was recognized that the details of a judicial system under the Constitution as it then
stood must be framed and put into operation, as a statute, by the First Congress,
before the new Government could function at all.”  Charles Warren, New Light on
the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 , 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 57 (1923).
21 Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).  It is generally
accepted that the First Congress included an amount in controversy requirement for
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diversity statute at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and increased the amount in
controversy requirement five times, most recently in 1996, by
raising it to $75,000.22  Proposals to further increase the amount
in controversy requirement are relatively common, perhaps even
an annual event.23
Although the statute sets a numerical target (i.e., $75,000), de-
termining whether a case surpasses that target can be surprisingly
troublesome.24  While a full exposition of this nettlesome area is
beyond the scope of this Article, the task of determining whether
diversity suits as a compromise to allay the fears of the Anti-Federalists who worried
that the proposed federal judiciary would usurp the states’ judicial authority.
Thomas E. Baker, The History and Tradition of the Amount in Controversy Require-
ment:  A Proposal to “Up the Ante” in Diversity Jurisdiction , 102 F.R.D. 299, 305-06
(1984).  The fixing of the amount at $500, however, likely sprung from a baser moti-
vation—a desire to keep claims by British creditors against American debtors out of
the federal courts for fear that the federal courts might actually honor the Peace
Treaty that ended the Revolutionary War and honor the claims. See  William R.
Casto, The First Congress’s Understanding of its Authority Over the Federal Courts’
Jurisdiction , 26 B.C. L. REV. 1101, 1112 (1985).  Since the majority of the British
claims were for less than $500, the claims would continue to be heard only in state
courts, which were notorious for rejecting such claims despite the fact that the Peace
Treaty ending the Revolutionary War forbade laws impeding their collection. Id.  at
1111.  Several commentators have noted as an example the $400 “quit rent” claims
held by the assignees of Lord Fairfax against the State of Virginia arising from the
confiscation of Lord Fairfax’s estate. See id.  at 1112 n.83; see also  Baker, supra , at
305; Warren, supra  note 20, at 78.
22 The increases were as follows: to $2,000 in 1887, Act of Mar. 3, 1887, 49 Cong.
Ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552; to $3,000 in 1911, Act of Mar. 3, 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-475, 36
Stat. 1091; to $10,000 in 1958, Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, 72 Stat. 415;
to $50,000 in 1988, Act of Nov. 19, 1988 Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4646; and,
finally, to $75,000 in 1996, Act of Oct. 19, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3850.
For a discussion of the political circumstances surrounding many of these increases,
as well as the short-lived decrease brought about in 1801 by the “Midnight Judges
Act,” see Baker, supra  note 21, at 307-08.
23 See  14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 3701, at 15 (3d ed. 1998) [hereinafter, 14B FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE].  If there has been any overriding theme to the increases, it is that while
diversity jurisdiction exists to protect out-of-state litigants from local prejudice, see
13B FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra  note 19, § 3601, at 338; see also
Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction , 41 HARV. L. REV.
483, 492-93 (1927-28) (discussing the prejudice argument but noting the lack of any
specific examples in the contemporaneous record), Congress should vest only so
much diversity jurisdiction as it thinks is necessary out of respect for state sover-
eignty and to conserve federal funds. See  Baker, supra  note 21, at 305-06 (identify-
ing judicial federalism, cost efficiency, and case load constraints as the dominant
factors influencing amount in controversy debates); see also  Horton v. Liberty Mu-
tual Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 351 (1961) (acknowledging that Congress raised the
amount in controversy requirement to $10,000 in 1958 to reduce congestion in the
district courts).
24 See  15 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra  note 10, § 102.100 (“It has not al-
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the federal courts are properly valuing class claims for common
relief requires consideration of three foundational issues:  (1)
what items count towards the amount in controversy, (2) how to
value the various claims, and (3) whether to aggregate the value
of joined claims.  Part I then examines how the courts historically
have applied these general valuation rules in class actions.
A. What Items of Relief Count
Section 1332(a) grants jurisdiction in diversity cases “where
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000,
exclusive of interest and costs.”25  The Supreme Court has con-
strued this text to differentiate items of relief that the underlying
substantive law affords in the way of damages from losses stem-
ming from the general expense and delay associated with litiga-
tion.26  Pursuant to this framework, the Supreme Court has
defined the matter in controversy to include not just claims for
compensatory damages, but also claims for punitive damages
where they are recoverable at law,27 and claims for attorneys’
fees where a contract or statute creates a basis for their recov-
ery.28  It also it is well established that the matter in controversy
includes the value of equitable remedies, such as the value of
ways been a simple task to determine whether a particular diversity case meets the
jurisdictional minimum.”).
25 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000).
26 See  14B FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra  note 23, § 3712. By way
of example, interest is included where it is an element of damages arising from the
underlying claim, but is excluded when it is an incident of delay. See  15 MOORE’S
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra  note 10, § 102.106[5][b]; compare  St. Paul Reinsurance
Co. v. Greenberg, 134 F.3d 1250, 1254-55 (5th Cir. 1998) (interest in insurance denial
claim counts towards amount in controversy because statute provides for interest in
such claims as a form of damages) with  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Narvaez,
149 F.3d 1269, 1271 (10th Cir. 1998) (interest in insurance denial claims does not
count towards amount in controversy where basis for interest is delay in payment of
underlying claim).  For a more thorough discussion of when the value of the matter
in controversy includes interest and costs, see Roger M. Baron, Commentary, The
“Amount in Controversy” Controversy:  Using Interest, Costs, and Attorneys’ Fees in
Computing Its Value , 41 OKLA. L. REV. 257 (1988).
27 Bell v. Preferred Life Assurance Soc’y, 320 U.S. 238, 240 (1943); see also  15
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra  note 10, § 102.106[4].
28 See  Mo. State Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 290 U.S. 199, 202 (1933) (including attor-
neys’ fees in amount in controversy calculation even where state authorizing statute
denominated them as “costs”); see also  15 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra
note 10, § 102.106[6][a]. But see  Hart v. Schering-Plough Corp., 253 F.3d 272, 274
(7th Cir. 2001) (holding that jurisdictional amount only includes attorneys’ fees in-
curred prior to the filing of the suit, even when state fee-shifting statute would allow
plaintiff to recover fees incurred during the course of litigation).
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injunctive relief.29
B. The Basic Principles of Claim Valuation
Once a court determines which items of relief count towards
the amount in controversy, the court must determine the value of
those items.30  The bedrock rule of claim valuation is that the
value placed on the claim by the plaintiff controls unless “it is
apparent, to a legal certainty, that the plaintiff cannot recover the
amount claimed. . . .”31  Whether the sum claimed by the plaintiff
is beyond reach “to a legal certainty” depends on whatever
boundaries the underlying substantive law sets for potential dam-
ages recovery.32  Sometimes this showing is easy, such as where a
statute caps the plaintiff’s potential recovery at less than the ju-
risdictional amount,33 or where the item of relief claimed is
29 14B FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra  note 23, § 3708; see infra
notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
30 The party invoking federal subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of show-
ing that the claim values exceed the jurisdictional amount.  14B FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE, supra  note 23, § 3702, at 33-34; see also  McNutt v. Gen.
Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936) (stating that in a suit originally
filed in federal court, the predicates for jurisdiction “must be met by the party who
seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor”).  Thus, the plaintiff must establish the
amount in controversy when he or she files the suit originally in federal court,
whereas it is the defendant’s burden when the defendant removes a case originally
filed in state court. See  15 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra  note 10,
§ 102.107[1] (discussing which party bears the burden).  The court must measure its
value as of the date that one of the parties first invokes the federal court’s jurisdic-
tion, either by originally filing the action in federal court or by removing it from a
state court.  St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 290-93
(1938).  While later developments can shed light on what the true amount in contro-
versy was at the time federal jurisdiction was first invoked, subsequent events cannot
oust jurisdiction once it has attached. Id.  at 292-93; see also  15 MOORE’S FEDERAL
PRACTICE, supra  note 10, § 102.104[2] (“[C]ourts have distinguished between subse-
quent events  that change the amount in controversy and subsequent revelations  that
show, in fact, that the required amount was or was not in controversy at the com-
mencement of the suit.” (emphasis added)).
31 St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. , 303 U.S. at 289.
32 See  15 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra  note 10, § 102.101 (“[I]n a diversity
case, the substantive questions surrounding the measure of damages are purely a
matter of state law.”).
33 See  Kopp v. Kopp, 280 F.3d 883, 885 (8th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he maximum amount
of damages can often be determined with complete accuracy before trial, as in cases
involving liquidated damages or statutory limits on damages.”); see , e.g. , Sharrow v.
Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 938 F. Supp. 518, 520 (C.D. Ill. 1996) (noting that
even if punitive damages were available, they would be capped by statute at
$25,000); see generally  15 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra  note 10, § 102.106[2]
(discussing various kinds of objective limits on the amount recoverable).
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wholly unavailable for the cause of action in question.34  Other
times, the legal certainty test requires the court to measure po-
tential recovery against an imprecise boundary.  For example, a
court can find an uncapped and unliquidated damages claim to
be jurisdictionally insufficient if, based on the evidence available,
the court finds that no reasonable jury could legally award
enough in damages to satisfy the amount in controversy require-
ment.35  The Supreme Court, however, has cautioned the lower
courts to be wary of making such conclusions at the beginning of
the case, given the lack of a mathematical formula for determin-
ing unliquidated damages and the lack of a developed record at
the pleadings stage.36  Thus, under the legal certainty test,
“courts must be very confident that a party cannot recover the
jurisdictional amount before dismissing the case for want of
jurisdiction.”37
The legal certainty test also controls the valuation of punitive
damage claims.38  The first step in the analysis is to determine
whether the cause of action asserted lawfully could ever support
a punitive damages award.39  The second step then addresses the
plaintiff’s particular claim and asks whether, despite their general
availability, it is nevertheless clear to a legal certainty that the
plaintiff could not recover enough in punitive damages to meet
the jurisdictional minimum.40  This step typically looks to see if
the defendant’s alleged conduct was sufficiently reprehensible to
34 See  Anthony v. Sec. Pac. Fin. Servs., Inc., 75 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 1996) (hold-
ing that a court cannot consider the value of a punitive damages claim where they
are not recoverable as a matter of law).
35 See Kopp , 280 F.3d at 885 (upholding jurisdiction after concluding “that an
award of damages of more than $75,000 would not have to be set aside as excessive”
under Missouri law or the Due Process Clause).
36 Bell v. Preferred Life Assurance Soc’y, 320 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1943).
37 15 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra  note 10, § 102.106[1].
38 See Bell , 320 U.S. at 240 (While plaintiff had only $1,000 in actual damages,
“the question remains whether it is apparent to a legal certainty from the complaint
that he could not recover, in addition, sufficient punitive damages to make up the
requisite $3,000”).
39 See  Cadek v. Great Lakes Dragaway, Inc., 58 F.3d 1209, 1212 (7th Cir. 1995);
Nwachukwu v. Karl, 223 F. Supp. 2d 60, 66 (D.D.C. 2002); see also  15 MOORE’S
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra  note 10, § 102.106[4].  A plaintiff obviously fails the legal
certainty test if punitive damages are never available under the applicable substan-
tive law. See , e.g. , Packard v. Provident Nat’l Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1046 (3d Cir.
1993) (dismissing for insufficient amount in controversy because the punitive dam-
ages award necessary to attain the jurisdictional amount was not available for the
type of claim alleged).
40 See Cadek , 58 F.3d at 1212.
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actually warrant punitive damages,41 but it also can ask whether
the amount needed is unavailable to a legal certainty because it
would be excessive, either under state law or under the Due Pro-
cess Clause.42
It is sometimes said that claims for punitive damages are sub-
ject to closer scrutiny than claims for actual damages.43  This sen-
timent seems to reflect a fear that punitive damages claims, if not
examined critically, might undermine the amount in controversy
check on diversity jurisdiction.44  One interpretation of this lan-
guage is simply that courts should not assume that every punitive
damages claim has the potential to yield $75,000; in other words,
even where a type of claim generally can give rise to a punitive
damages award, the court still must carefully consider whether
the plaintiff actually asserts conduct that would warrant it, either
at all or in the amount requested.45  To the extent that is what is
going on, it is an application of the legal certainty test, rather
than an exception to it.46  If, however, the “closer scrutiny” lan-
41 See  Larkin v. Brown, 41 F.3d 387, 389 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that while puni-
tive damages could be had in a claim for assault and battery, the conduct alleged was
not sufficiently willful or outrageous as to support an award of punitive damages
under Missouri law).
42 Compare  Kopp v. Kopp, 280 F.3d 883, 886 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding amount in
controversy met by punitive damages claim because the required award “would not
have to be set aside as excessive under Missouri law, nor would such an award be so
‘grossly excessive’ as to violate the Due Process Clause of the United States Consti-
tution”) with  Anthony v. Sec. Pac. Fin. Servs., Inc., 75 F.3d 311, 317-18 (7th Cir.
1996) (finding that the $47,000 in punitive damages needed to meet the jurisdictional
amount would be excessive as a matter of law and therefore “would face certain
remittitur”).
43 See Anthony , 75 F.3d at 315; Larkin, 41 F.3d at 389; Packard v. Provident Nat’l
Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1046 (3d Cir. 1993).  The Third Circuit’s decision in Packard  in
turn cites Zahn v. International Paper Co. , 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972), aff’d  414
U.S. 291 (1973).  While the Second Circuit in Zahn  did assert that punitive damage
claims merited closer scrutiny, 469 F.2d at 1033 n.1, the Supreme Court’s decision
does not address that issue.
44 See  Del Vecchio v. Conseco Inc., 230 F.3d 974, 978-79 (7th Cir. 2000) (The
value of punitive damage claims “must be assessed critically; otherwise, the statutory
limits on federal court jurisdiction could be undermined”).
45 See , e.g. , Cadek , 58 F.3d at 1212 (after finding that punitive damages were
available for a claim of fraud, then scrutinizing plaintiff’s allegations to see if the
nature of the wrongdoing would in fact support punitive damages and, if so, in the
needed amount); Nwachukwu v. Karl, 223 F. Supp. 2d 60, 68 (D.D.C. 2002) (finding
that punitive damages were available for a claim of breach of fiduciary duty, then
scrutinizing plaintiff’s allegations to see if the conduct alleged was sufficiently willful
and reckless).
46 As discussed above, the Larkin  court rejected the punitive damages claim for
lack of sufficiently culpable conduct—a legal ruling.  41 F.3d at 389.  Similarly, the
Anthony  court rejected the punitive damages claim when it ruled that the amount
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guage signals that courts hold punitive damages claims to some-
thing higher than the legal certainty standard,47 it is difficult to
square that result with the Supreme Court’s decision in Bell v.
Preferred Life Assurance Society of Montgomery .48
Claims seeking non-monetary relief, such as a request for an
injunction or a declaratory judgment, must also be valued and
included in the amount in controversy.49  Here, too, the question
is whether the court can say to a legal certainty that the value of
the claims asserted is less than the jurisdictional amount.50 How-
ever, there is no consensus in the federal courts on exactly how
to measure the value of injunctive relief.51  Although the Su-
preme Court has instructed that “[i]n actions seeking declaratory
or injunctive relief . . . the amount in controversy is measured by
needed was unavailable as a matter of law.  75 F.3d at 317.  Neither court suggested
that it was altering its judgments about what the law would allow just because the
cases straddled the border of the amount in controversy requirement.  Rather, the
opinions are best read as making customary legal rulings about the potential for and
limits on damages and then applying those conclusions to the legal certainty analysis.
47 Salmi v. D.T. Mgmt., Inc., No. 02-C-2741, 2002 WL 31115581 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 23,
2002), might be one such case.  The plaintiff in Salmi , a guest at the defendant’s
hotel, sustained minor injuries after being allegedly assaulted by one of the defen-
dant’s employees. Id.  at *1.  He based the jurisdictional amount on his combined
claim for compensatory and punitive damages.  However, in light of the plaintiff’s
minor injuries and the fact that he was intoxicated at the time of the alleged assault,
the court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, stating that the
“[p]laintiff’s mere hope for an extreme punitive award cannot be the sole basis for
jurisdiction.” Id.  at *3.  To the extent that the court rejected the potential punitive
damages value just because it would be extreme—but not legally excessive—the
court truly was valuing the punitive damages under a stricter standard than legal
certainty.  There is some evidence, however, that the court implicitly found that the
extreme award would also be legally excessive, and therefore unavailable to a legal
certainty. Id.  (stating that the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages
at issue “would face certain remittur” (quoting Anthony , 75 F.3d at 317-18)).
48 Bell v. Preferred Life Assurance Soc’y, 320 U.S. 238, 240-41 (1943) (invoking
specifically the legal certainty test and concluding that the amount in controversy
was met because “we are satisfied that under the law of Alabama as well as that of
South Carolina petitioner’s allegations of fraud if properly proved might justify an
award exceeding $3,000”).
49 See , e.g. , Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advertising Comm., 432 U.S. 333, 347
(1977) (analyzing whether an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief satis-
fied the amount in controversy requirement); McNutt v. General Motors Accept-
ance Corp. of Ind., Inc., 298 U.S. 178, 189-90 (1936) (dismissing suit seeking
injunctive relief for failure to adequately establish amount in controversy); Brittain
Shaw McInnis, Comment, The $75,000.01 Question:  What is the Value of Injunctive
Relief , 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1013, 1039-42 (1998) (discussing Supreme Court
cases analyzing amount in controversy in equity cases).
50 See Hunt , 432 U.S. at 347 (sustaining jurisdiction where the facts “preclude our
saying ‘to a legal certainty’” that the amount in controversy was not satisfied).
51 See generally  McInnis, supra  note 49, at 1013, 1041.
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the value of the object of the litigation,”52 the Court has never
stated whether this is measured from the perspective of the plain-
tiff or the defendant.53  Currently, five circuits value injunctive
relief solely from the plaintiff’s perspective.54  Six other circuits
allow the court to value claims for injunctive relief from either
the plaintiff’s perspective or the defendant’s perspective, which-
ever is greater.55
C. The Aggregation Rules
The rules regarding aggregation are both clear and liberal for
simple claim joinder.  Under Rule 18(a), a single plaintiff may
join together in the same suit as many claims he or she has
against any single defendant, even if those claims are entirely un-
related.56  It is well-settled that, when a single plaintiff joins
claims against a single defendant under Rule 18(a), the aggregate
value of the joined claims determines whether the amount in
controversy requirement is satisfied, regardless of whether the
52 Hunt , 432 U.S. at 347.
53 In 2002, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Ford Motor Co. v. McCauley ,
to decide whether plaintiffs may satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement of
28 U.S.C. § 1332 by showing that the defendant’s costs of complying with the injunc-
tion the plaintiff class seeks would exceed $75,000 irrespective of whether the injunc-
tion covered merely one plaintiff or all members of the class.  534 U.S. 1126 (2002),
rev’g In re  Ford Motor Co./Citibank (S.D.), 264 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2001).  On Octo-
ber 15, 2002, however, the Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improv-
idently granted.  Ford Motor Co. v. McCauley, 537 U.S. 1 (2002).
54 See  Ericsson GE Mobile Communications, Inc. v. Motorola Communications &
Elecs., Inc., 120 F.3d 216, 219 (11th Cir. 1997); In re  Corestates Trust Fee Litig., 39
F.3d 61, 65 (3d Cir. 1994); Kheel v. Port Auth., 457 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1972); Mass.
State Pharm. Ass’n v. Federal Prescription Serv., Inc., 431 F.2d 130, 132 n.1 (8th Cir.
1970); Alfonso v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth., 308 F.2d 724, 727 (5th Cir.
1962).
55 In re  Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 609 (7th
Cir. 1997); Justice v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 927 F.2d 503, 505 (10th Cir.
1991); Smith v. Washington, 593 F.2d 1097, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Berman v. Narra-
gansett Racing Ass’n, 414 F.2d 311, 314 (1st Cir. 1969); Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v.
Lally, 327 F.2d 568, 569 (4th Cir. 1964); Ridder Bros. v. Blethen, 142 F.2d 395, 399
(9th Cir. 1944).
56 Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a).  Rule 18(a), however, is only a rule of pleading.  The
Court retains power to try unrelated claims separately.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b).  More
fundamentally, the fact that a rule allows joinder as a procedural device does not
affect whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the joined claims.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 82 (“These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdic-
tion of the United States district courts.”); see also  6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1588 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing relation-
ship between joinder and jurisdiction, with illustrations).
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claims are transactionally related.57
A much different situation is presented when separate parties
join together as plaintiffs under Rule 20(a) and assert their re-
spective claims in a single suit against a common defendant.58  In
contrast to the unlimited aggregation of the value of joined
claims, the diversity statute rarely allows joined parties to aggre-
gate the value of their claims to satisfy the amount in controversy
requirement.59  As the Supreme Court explains, “when several
plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title or right, in which they
have a common and undivided interest, it is enough if their inter-
ests collectively equal the jurisdictional amount.”60  On the other
hand, “[w]hen two or more plaintiffs, having separate and dis-
tinct demands, unite for convenience and economy in a single
suit, it is essential that the demand of each be of the requisite
jurisdictional amount.”61 Many commentators have criticized the
Supreme Court’s dichotomy between “common and undivided
interests” and “separate and distinct demands” as confusing and
inapt, at least outside of traditional property disputes.62
57 See  15 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra  note 10, § 102.108[1]; 14B FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra  note 23, § 3704, at 130; see also  Jeffrey L.
Rensberger, The Amount in Controversy:  Understanding the Rules of Aggregation ,
26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 925, 926-27 (1994).
58 Rule 20(a) allows plaintiff party joinder where the different plaintiffs’ claims
are related transactionally and present common issues of law or fact. FED. R. CIV.
P. 20(a).  Similarly, Rule 20 authorizes a plaintiff to sue multiple defendants in the
same suit if the claims against the various defendants are related transactionally and
present common issues of law or fact. Id.
59 See  15 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra  note 10, § 102.108[3][a]; 14B FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra  note 10, § 3704, at 146-48 (listing illustra-
tive cases); see also  7 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1659 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing intersection between Rule 20 party
joinder and subject matter jurisdiction).
60 Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1911).
61 Id.  at 40.  The “non-aggregation” rule also applies when a single plaintiff asserts
claims against joined defendants: No matter how related the plaintiff’s claims
against the two defendants might be, the plaintiff may not aggregate the value of
those claims but instead must show that he has a jurisdictionally sufficient claim
against each of them. See  15 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra  note 10,
§ 102.108[2]; 14B FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra  note 23, § 3704, at
141.
62 15 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra  note 10, § 102.108[3][b] (“Today, ask-
ing whether rights are properly characterized as joint or several rivals the question
of how many angels dance on the head of a pin for both difficulty and practical
significance.”); 14B FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra  note 23, § 3704, at
150; see also  Rensberger, supra  note 57, at 925 (“The language of the test for [party]
aggregation is mystifying and has perplexed many law students and practitioners.”).
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D. The Basic Principles of Valuing Class Actions
Rule 23 authorizes one or more persons to sue, as representa-
tive parties, on behalf of a class of similarly-situated persons.63
Rule 23 includes various requirements designed to ensure that
there really is a class of similarly-situated persons, that the plain-
tiff who seeks to lead the class is an appropriate representative,
and that the parties’ respective claims are well-suited to class-
wide resolution.64  But Rule 23 is still just a rule of joinder.65  It
does not create substantive liability, but instead creates a litiga-
tion package for the efficient resolution of separate but related
claims.66  Thus, while a class member’s fate merges with that of
the class, his claim does not.
With respect to the amount in controversy requirement for di-
versity jurisdiction, it is now well-settled that class actions follow
the same aggregation rules as other forms of litigation.67 The Su-
preme Court had applied the historical aggregation rules to class
actions under the original Rule 23,68 which differentiated “true”
class action from “spurious” class actions based precisely on
63 FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
64 Id. ; see generally  1 HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS
ACTIONS § 1.01 (3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter 1 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS] (discuss-
ing representative nature of class actions).
65 For a competing view that classes can and should be viewed not as aggregations
of individuals but as freestanding entities in their own right, see David L. Shapiro,
Class Actions:  The Class as Party and Client , 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913 (1998).
But see  John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability:  Reconciling Exit, Voice,
and Loyalty in Representative Litigation , 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 385 (2000) (re-
jecting entity theory of class actions).  Professor Shapiro’s thesis highlights an in-
triguing circularity inherent to class actions and jurisdiction.  On one hand, viewing
the class based on its sum rather than its parts better accounts for the fact that class
status fundamentally alters the dynamics of the dispute, in large part by greatly en-
hancing the viability of many types of claims and adding substantial settlement pres-
sures.  Shapiro, supra , at 924.  On the other hand, under the current diversity
statute, a federal court must have jurisdiction over the “parts” before it can turn
them into a group. See  Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973) (holding
that regardless of what federal court does with the jurisdictionally sufficient plain-
tiffs, federal court must dismiss the jurisdictionally insufficient ones).
66 See 1 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra  note 64, at § 1.02; see also  15
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra  note 10, § 23.02 (discussing purposes of Rule
23 class action rule).
67 In curious contrast, class actions follow a different rule from other forms of
litigation for purposes of determining diversity of citizenship, as only the citizenship
of the named plaintiffs is considered. See  Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255
U.S. 356, 367 (1921).
68 See  Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 588-89 (1939) (finding that the class
members claims were separate and distinct, dismissing the jurisdictionally insuffi-
cient plaintiffs).
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whether the class members held their rights in common or sepa-
rately.69  The 1966 amendments to Rule 23 abandoned those
rights-based categories and replaced them with the modern func-
tional categories.70  In Snyder v. Harris , the Supreme Court con-
sidered whether, since Rule 23 no longer categorized class
actions based on whether the class members held their rights
jointly or separately, the courts should similarly abandon the
traditional aggregation rules and value all class actions based on
the total amount in controversy.71  The Supreme Court rejected
the argument, holding that it was up to Congress to change the
valuation rules for diversity jurisdiction, and that the Rule 23
changes did not signal any such intent.72  Accordingly, Snyder  re-
affirmed that, when the claims of the class members are “sepa-
rate and distinct,” all class members—including absent class
members—must satisfy the amount in controversy require-
ment.73  But by leaving the traditional valuation rules in place,
the Supreme Court also reaffirmed that aggregate valuation is
appropriate “in cases in which two or more plaintiffs unite to en-
force a single title or right in which they have a common and
undivided interest.”74
One issue that is currently unresolved is whether federal courts
may take supplemental jurisdiction over absent class members
who cannot satisfy the amount in controversy requirement. Four
years after Snyder , the Supreme Court addressed this issue in
Zahn v. International Paper Co. .75  The Supreme Court unequiv-
69 See  5 JEROLD S. SOLOVY ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 23 App. 01
(3d ed. 2003) [hereinafter 5 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE] (containing text of the
original Rule 23).
70 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note (1966) (discussing problems
under the old Rule 23 categories and stating that “[t]he amended rule  describes in
more practical terms the occasions for maintaining class actions”) (emphasis added).
71 Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 335-36 (1969).
72 Id.  at 339-42; see also  Redish, supra note 4, at 1807-08 (explaining Snyder ’s
approach to the relationship between Rule 23 and diversity); see generally  15
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra  note 10, § 102.108[4][a] (discussing theory of
Snyder].  The Supreme Court confirmed this understanding in Zahn: “The [Snyder]
Court unmistakably rejected the notion that the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were
intended to effect, or effected, any change in the meaning and application of the
jurisdictional amount requirement insofar as class actions were concerned.”  Zahn v.
Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 299 (1973).
73 Snyder , 394 U.S. at 340-41.
74 Id.  at 335; see also  5 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra  note 69,
§ 23.07[3][b][i] (discussing availability of aggregate valuation of class actions where
class members have a common and undivided interest).
75 414 U.S. at 292.
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ocally rejected the argument and made clear that, under the ex-
isting valuation rules, all class members must meet the
jurisdictional amount, and thus may not “piggyback” on the juris-
dictionally-sufficient claims of the lead plaintiffs.76  To date, how-
ever, five circuits have held that the supplemental jurisdiction
statute overruled Zahn  and now confers federal subject matter
jurisdiction over the monetarily-insufficient class members pro-
vided the lead plaintiff satisfies the amount in controversy re-
quirement.77  While this issue does not alter the operation  of the
valuation rules, it does have important consequences for them.
Specifically, it is now even more important to properly calculate
the per class member value of common relief, since it may take
only one jurisdictionally sufficient class member to anchor fed-
eral subject matter jurisdiction for the entire class.78
II
HOW THE COURTS CONSIDERED BUT ULTIMATELY REJECTED
VALUING CLASS ACTION COMMON RELIEF CLAIMS IN
THE AGGREGATE
It was just a matter of time before litigants began testing the
limits of common and undivided interest aggregation in the con-
text of class actions.  One of the hottest issues in the mid-to late
1990s was whether a class claim for punitive damages presented a
common and undivided interest, such that the full amount of the
class-wide punitive damages claim established the jurisdictional
amount for the entire class.  The rationale for that assertion was
that punitive damages, which are awarded to punish and deter
76 Id . at 301.
77 See  Allapattah Servs. Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 333 F.3d 1248, 1253-56 (11th Cir.
2003); Rosmer v. Pfizer, Inc., 263 F.3d 110, 114 (4th Cir. 2001); Gibson v. Chrysler
Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 933-34 (9th Cir. 2001); In re  Brand Name Prescription Drugs
Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 607 (7th Cir. 1997); In re  Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524,
528-29 (5th Cir. 1995).  Other circuits hold that the rule of Zahn  survives. See  Trim-
ble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d 946, 962 (8th Cir. 2000); Meritcare, Inc. v. St. Paul
Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214, 222 (3d Cir. 1999); Leonhardt v. Western Sugar Co.,
160 F.3d 631, 640 (10th Cir. 1998).  The Supreme Court had an opportunity to re-
solve this issue in Abbott Laboratories  but affirmed by an evenly divided court. See
Free v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 529 U.S. 333 (2000).  For a recent discussion of this ongo-
ing split, including an argument in support of the Tenth Circuit’s approach in Leon-
hardt , see James E. Pfander, The Simmering Debate Over Supplemental Jurisdiction ,
2002 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1209 (2002).
78 See , e.g. , Louque v. Allstate Ins. Co., 314 F.3d 776, 782 (5th Cir. 2002) (taking
diversity jurisdiction over class representative based on value of attorneys’ fees and
then exercising supplemental jurisdiction over absent class members).
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rather than to compensate, constituted a pool of relief that was
common to the class members.  At roughly the same time, crea-
tive litigants were exploring whether they could invoke common
and undivided interest theory for other forms of relief that pro-
vided a common benefit to the class, such as attorneys’ fees, in-
junctive relief, and restitution.
The argument nearly succeeded, but it failed in the end.  Al-
though a few early cases adopted (or appeared to adopt) an ex-
pansive view of what constitutes a common and undivided
interest, those decisions have either been repudiated or dramati-
cally narrowed.79  Currently, courts will value class claims in the
aggregate only where the class members held the underlying sub-
stantive rights jointly prior to the class suit, and reject aggregate
valuation that is predicated solely on the fact that the class action
will yield relief that accrues to the class members collectively.
A. Punitive Damages
The aggregation issue with the greatest potential impact on the
federal docket is whether class claims for punitive damages con-
stitute a common and undivided interest.  The issue necessarily
affects a large number of cases because punitive damages are so
widely available as a matter of state substantive law.80  Moreo-
ver, in the class action context involving numerous injured par-
ties, the total amount of punitive damages is virtually assured to
exceed $75,000.  Thus, as a practical matter, if class claims for
punitive damages are common and undivided interests to be val-
ued in the aggregate, almost any state law class action in which
punitive damages are sought would satisfy the amount in contro-
versy requirement for diversity jurisdiction.
79 See infra  notes 80-109 and accompanying text (discussing rejection of aggrega-
tion of class claims for punitive damages).
80 Almost every jurisdiction authorizes punitive damages of one sort or another.  1
JOHN J. KIRCHER & CHRISTINE M. WISEMAN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES:  LAW AND
PRACTICE § 4.01 (2d ed. 2003).  Most jurisdictions define punitive damages as those
damages that are awarded above and beyond what is needed to fully compensate the
plaintiff for his or her injuries. Id. ; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 908(1) (1979) (defining punitive damages as being “other than compensatory or
nominal damages”); MODEL PUNITIVE DAMAGES ACT § 1 (1996) (adopting express
dichotomy between compensatory and punitive damages).  A few states, however,
award additional damages denominated as punitive damages but disclaim that they
exist to punish or deter, but rather exist to reimburse plaintiffs for losses not other-
wise compensable under applicable law. See  1 GERALD W. BOSTON, STEIN ON PER-
SONAL INJURY DAMAGES § 4:5 (3d ed. 1997).
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At one point, it appeared that the courts might find class
claims for punitive damages to constitute a common and undi-
vided interest based on the collective nature of the punitive dam-
age award.  In the leading case, Tapscott v. MS Dealer Service
Corp. , the Eleventh Circuit held that the class claim for punitive
damages sought under Alabama law in that case constituted “a
single collective right in which the putative class has a common
and undivided interest.”81  The court first noted that the purpose
of punitive damages under Alabama law was not to compensate
victims for loss but rather to punish defendants for past wrongful
conduct and to deter future wrongful conduct.82  As such, the
court explained, they are akin to a collective good awarded for
the benefit of the public.83  Second, and relatedly, the court
noted that a defendant’s liability for punitive damages is deter-
mined by its course of conduct as a whole, rather than its acts
towards any particular individual.84  Finally, the court empha-
sized that, in the event the class were to succeed in its punitive
damage claim, the award would be split evenly by the class mem-
bers such that “the failure of one plaintiff’s claim will increase
the share of successful plaintiffs.”85
In finding the class claim for punitive damages to be a common
and undivided interest, the Tapscott  court focused on the collec-
tive aspects of obtaining and distributing an award  of punitive
damages.  Because the purpose of punitive damages is to punish
defendants for egregious conduct and deter similar behavior in
the future,86 the typical punitive damages analysis focuses
predominantly on characteristics of the defendant, such as the
81 Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1359 (11th Cir. 1996).  The
plaintiffs in Tapscott  asserted various state law claims arising from the defendants’
sales of service contracts. Id.  at 1355.  The case was filed as a putative class action in
Alabama state court and sought unspecified monetary damages, including punitive
damages and injunctive relief. Id.  The defendants invoked diversity and removed,
arguing that the amount in controversy was satisfied because the class sought an
aggregate punitive damages award that was undisputed to be in excess of $50,000,
the jurisdictional amount prevailing at the time. Id.  at 1357 n.10.
82 Id.  at 1358.
83 Id.  at 1358.
84 Id.  at 1358-59.
85 Id.  at 1359.
86 See  Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432
(2001); see also  1 Kircher & Wiseman, supra , note 80, § 4.12-4.13; Cass R. Sunstein
et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law) ,
107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2081 (1998) (“The traditional view is that punitive awards serve
deterrent and retributive goals.”).
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nature of the defendant’s wrongful conduct, the nature and ex-
tent of harm the defendant has caused, and the defendant’s fi-
nancial condition.87  Historically, the characteristics of the
plaintiff have played a minor role at best.88  Indeed, in the class
action context, a claim for punitive damages might not vary at
all—either in the evidence that was presented or in the size of
the award—based on the absence or presence of any individual
class member.  From this vantage point, the claim appears to be
collective because the award yields relief to the group, based on
the defendant’s conduct to the group, rather than to any particu-
lar individual.
In Gilman v. BHC Securities, Inc.,  however, the Second Circuit
emphatically rejected the “collective relief” approach taken by
Tapscott  and held that the New York law claim for punitive dam-
ages at issue in that case did not constitute a common and undi-
vided interest.89  The Gilman  court began by attempting to
define generally what constitutes an aggregable common and un-
divided interest.  After canvassing the Supreme Court precedent
and various cases that had allowed aggregation under the com-
mon and undivided interest exception, the Second Circuit found
the organizing principle to be whether the plaintiffs’ claims in-
volved a “single indivisible res,” such that the rights of one plain-
tiff could not be adjudicated without implicating the rights of the
other plaintiffs.90  Thus, the court held that Snyder  and Zahn
barred it from considering the aggregate value of the class claim
for punitive damages “absent a prior determination that the un-
87 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra  note 80, § 908(2) (listing fac-
tors); Model Punitive Damages Act, supra  note 80, § 7(a) (same).  Additional fac-
tors might include: whether the defendant profited from his egregious conduct, id.
§ 7(a)(5); whether the defendant has taken—or not taken—any remedial measures,
id . § 7(a)(7); or whether the defendant attempted to conceal its wrongdoing.  1 DAN
B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.11(14) (2d ed. 1993).
88 See  1 Kircher & Wiseman, supra , note 80, § 5.18.  The Supreme Court’s recent
decision in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell , 123 S. Ct.
1513 (2003), may alter this practice considerably. See infra  notes 233-243 and ac-
companying text.
89 Gilman v. BHC Secs., Inc., 104 F.3d 1418, 1422 (2nd Cir. 1997).  The putative
class plaintiffs were clients of BHC Securities, Inc. (BHC) who alleged that BHC
failed to inform them that it was receiving so-called “order flow payments” when it
placed securities orders for execution with certain companies. Id.  at 1420.  Charac-
terizing the order flow payments as kickbacks, the class sued in New York state
court, asserting state law claims for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty
and seeking compensatory damages, injunctive relief, and an unspecified amount of
punitive damages. Id.  BHC invoked diversity jurisdiction and removed. Id.
90 Id.  at 1423.
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derlying claim—the basis on which such damages are sought—
asserts a single title or right.”91
Applying this standard, the Second Circuit held that it could
not consider the total value of the class claim for punitive dam-
ages because, prior to the lawsuit, the class members never
claimed to have any shared rights or title with respect to BHC
Securities, Inc. (BHC).92  Rather, the only thing the class mem-
bers shared, according to the Second Circuit, was a desire to cre-
ate a “pool of recovery.”93  Moreover, that pool of recovery—the
punitive damages award—was available to all of the class mem-
bers regardless of whether they sued as a group or sued individu-
ally.94  Thus, the court concluded, the plaintiffs were joined as a
class not because they held indivisible claims against BHC, but
because joining forces against BHC was more convenient (and,
presumably, more effective) than suing separately.95
Since Gilman , the federal courts have overwhelmingly deter-
mined aggregation based on the class members’ underlying sub-
stantive rights, and not on the collective nature of the relief
generated by a class claim for punitive damages.96  While a hand-
ful of district courts continue to value punitive damages in the
aggregate,97 the Seventh,98 Eighth,99 Ninth,100 and Tenth101 Cir-
cuits have all followed Gilman  in holding that class claims for
91 Id.  at 1430.
92 Id.  at 1424.  Rather, the class members’ individual client-broker dealings with
BHC formed the basis for their claims for both compensatory and punitive damages.
Id.  at 1424, 1430.
93 Id.  at 1430.  Earlier in the opinion, when explaining why the plaintiffs’ compen-
satory claims could not be aggregated, the court expressed a similar sentiment, say-
ing that the only interest the plaintiffs had was a “shared appetite for a money
judgment.” Id.  at 1424.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 See  15 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra  note 10, § 102.108[4][b] (“All of
the circuits that have considered the issue have concluded that punitive damages
cannot be aggregated . . . for purposes of satisfying the amount in controversy
requirement.”).
97 See  Durant v. Servicemaster Co., 147 F. Supp. 2d 744, 751 (E.D. Mich. 2001);
see also  Knauer v. Ohio St. Life Ins. Co., 102 F. Supp. 2d 443, 449 (N.D. Ohio 2000)
(holding that punitive damages are common and undivided when complaint asserts
them as a collective claim).
98 In re  Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 608 (7th
Cir. 1997) (noting that the statute authorized individual “per violation” penalties,
rather than conferring a punitive claim to a group or to a representative member).
99 Crawford v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 267 F.3d 760 (8th Cir. 2001).
100 Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 2001).
101 Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 251 F.3d 1284 (10th Cir. 2001).
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punitive damages may be valued in the aggregate only where,
prior to being joined in a class action, the class members shared a
common title or right created by the underlying substantive law.
Indeed, even the Eleventh Circuit no longer follows the Tapscott
rule, having found that it conflicted with a prior, binding decision
from the “Old Fifth Circuit.”102
The only other circuit to have considered punitive damages ag-
gregation is the Fifth Circuit.  In fact, it was the first to do so,
deciding Allen v. R&H Oil & Gas Co.103 in 1995. Allen  involved
a 512-plaintiff, state court, tort action against the owners and op-
erators of an oil and gas well that had exploded.104 Although the
state court complaint pleaded no specific damages amount, the
defendants were able to successfully remove based on the fact
that the full amount of punitive damages being sought in the 512-
plaintiff case exceeded $50,000.105
Allen  is often cited as precedent for aggregating punitive dam-
ages as a common and undivided interest.106  Certainly, one of
the arguments urged by the removing defendants in Allen  was
that the court apply the common and undivided interest excep-
tion and aggregate their individual punitive damages claims.107
The removing defendants’ primary argument, however, was that
“the alleged punitive damage award could be assessed against
102 Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069, 1075-76 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding
that Tapscott  irreconcilably conflicted with Lindsey v. Alabama Telephone Co. , 576
F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1978)).  At this time, it is not clear that the Eleventh Circuit allows
aggregate valuation of punitive damages under any circumstances, even where the
class members held their underlying substantive rights in common. See  Leonard v.
Enter. Rent A Car, 279 F.3d 967, 973 (11th Cir. 2002) (Lindsey  “requir[es] us to
consider the punitive damages on a pro rata basis”); Morrison v. Allstate Indem.
Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1264 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he Cohen  Court held that prior bind-
ing precedent prohibited the aggregation of a class claim for punitive damages.”).
103 Allen v. R&H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326 (5th Cir. 1995).
104 Id.  at 1329.  The plaintiffs were all joined litigants, rather than class members
being represented by a lead plaintiff, because Mississippi does not have a class ac-
tion rule and allows “common law” class actions only in very limited circumstances.
See  Am. Bankers Ins. Co. v. Booth, 830 So. 2d 1205, 1209-12 (Miss. 2002) (discussing
Mississippi’s class action law).
105 Allen , 63 F.3d at 1337.  Congress did not raise the jurisdictional amount to
$75,000 until 1996, well after the Allen  plaintiffs had filed suit. See supra  note 22
and accompanying text.
106 See  15 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra  note 10, § 102.108[3][c]; Willis,
supra  note 5, at 776 n.5. But see  Gilman v. BHC Secs., Inc., 104 F.3d 1418, 1429 n.11
(2d Cir. 1997) (“Significantly, the [Allen] opinion never holds that plaintiffs share a
common and undivided interest in punitive damages.”).
107 Allen , 63 F.3d at 1329.
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each individual plaintiff.”108  Ultimately, the court seems to have
settled on the latter, as evidenced by the following passage:
[U]nder the accepted view of punitive damages as a public
good, no aggregation—meaning the addition of separate
claims—is necessary, as each plaintiff’s share of an award is
not added up to exceed $50,000—just as one award does not
subtract from a future claimant’s entitlement.  Instead, the
claims, while jointly tried, are treated as belonging to each
plaintiff for jurisdictional purposes.  In sum, because of the
collective scope of punitive damages and their nature as indi-
vidual claims under Mississippi law, we hold that under Missis-
sippi law the amount of such an alleged award is counted
against each plaintiff’s required jurisdictional amount.109
Thus, fairly read, Allen  does not establish precedent for aggre-
gation at all, but instead holds only that, under Mississippi puni-
tive damages law, each individual is allowed to claim the full
value of the punitive damages that might conceivably be imposed
on the defendant.
B. Attorneys’ Fees
As with punitive damages, creative litigants have attempted to
use class claims for attorneys’ fees to satisfy the amount in con-
troversy requirement.  Specifically, they have argued that attor-
neys’ fee awards constitute a common and undivided interest
when sought in a class action, such that courts should consider
the total class-wide fee award when determining whether the
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.  To date, however, the
courts have rejected these efforts.  Their reasons for doing so,
however, vary depending on the source of the fees.
In some cases, the attorneys’ fees are recoverable under so-
called “fee-shifting” statutes, which award attorneys’ fees to
plaintiffs who bring (and, usually, prevail upon) particular types
of claims.  In these cases, the courts hold that Snyder  requires
them to look to whether the fee-shifting statute creates joint
rights to the fee award or whether it creates separate and distinct
fee rights for the individual claimants.110  Invariably, these fee
108 Id.
109 Id.  at 1334-35.
110 See  Crawford v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 267 F.3d 760, 766 (8th Cir. 2001);
Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1265-66 (11th Cir. 2000); Cohen v.
Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069, 1080-81 (11th Cir. 2000); Darden v. Ford Con-
sumer Fin. Co., 200 F.3d 753, 759 (11th Cir. 2000); Goldberg v. CPC Int’l, Inc., 678
F.2d 1365, 1367 (9th Cir. 1982).  The Ninth Circuit has long viewed fee aggregation
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statutes confer a claim for fees on any person who brings that
type of suit, such that every individual class member could have
asserted a claim for fees had they sued on their own.111  As such,
the courts have held that the fee claim is a separate and distinct
right held by each class member and therefore cannot be
aggregated.112
In other cases, the source of the fee is a common law rule that
awards attorneys’ fees to class counsel because the class action
has conferred a recovery or other benefit upon the absent class
members.113  In this situation, the court determines the size of
the fee—usually by awarding a percentage of the recovery, but
sometimes by making a lodestar calculation114—and then de-
ducts that amount from the class recovery.115  Because the fee
comes out of the fund, the courts hold that the fee award can be
valued in the aggregate only if the class members had a common
and undivided interest in the damages claim that generated the
fund.116  In other words, if the class claim for substantive liability
arguments as an end run around the Supreme Court’s aggregation rules. See
Goldberg , 678 F.2d at 1367 (asserting that aggregation argument “would seriously
undermine and [is] contrary to the rule expressed by the Supreme Court in
[Zahn]”).
111 See Crawford , 267 F.3d at 767 (Arkansas deceptive trade practices fee statute
creates separate and distinct fee rights); Morrison , 228 F.3d at 1266-67 (Florida in-
surance beneficiary litigation fee statute creates separate and distinct fee rights);
Cohen , 204 F.3d at 1081 (Florida deceptive trade practices fee statute creates sepa-
rate and distinct fee rights); Darden , 200 F.3d at 758 (Georgia RICO statute creates
separate and distinct fee rights).
112 See  15 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra  note 10, § 102.108[4][c]; see , e.g. ,
Mattingly v. Hughes Elecs. Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d 694, 698 (D. Md. 2000) (“[E]ach
member of the class, as a person who brought an action to recover for loss under the
Act, would be eligible to recover attorneys’ fees.  The holding of Abbott , therefore,
is inapposite, and the rule against aggregation applies to the request for attorneys’
fees.”).
113 See RAND/ICJ STUDY, supra  note 4, at 77 (“The underlying principle is that all
who share in the fund should share in paying the class attorney, even though they
have not entered into any prior agreement to hire and pay [the] attorney.”).
114 See  3 HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS
APP. § 14.01 (3d ed. 1992 & Supp. 2002) [hereinafter 3 NEWBERG ON CLASS AC-
TIONS] (listing circuit-by-circuit calculation methods) ; see also  Judith Resnik et al.,
Individuals Within the Aggregate:  Relationships, Representation, and Fees , 71 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 296, 339-345 (1996) (discussing critically common fund fee calculation
methods).
115 See  3 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra  note 114, § 14.02; see generally  7A
C.J.S. Attorney and Client  § 334 (1980) (discussing basis for and operation of com-
mon fund fee awards).
116 See  Leonard v. Enter. Rent A Car, 279 F.3d 967, 974 (11th Cir. 2002); Smith v.
GTE, Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1306 (11th Cir. 2001); Davis v. Carl Cannon Chevrolet-
Olds, Inc., 182 F.3d 792, 796 (11th Cir. 1999).
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was a collection of separate and distinct claims, then any fee
taken out of the damages fund generated by it must also be val-
ued as a separate and distinct claim.117  For all practical purposes,
this makes the common fund fee award useless for jurisdictional
purposes because, if the underlying award—which by definition
is much larger than the percentage-based fee award—is aggre-
gable, the underlying award would already have satisfied the ju-
risdictional amount.
Finally, some cases involve a statute that grants a fee right to
class counsel who generate a fund or other benefit to the class as
a whole.118  In these cases, the courts have focused almost exclu-
sively on whether the statute requires that the fee be attributed
to the lead plaintiff only, rather than to all of the class mem-
bers.119  Implicitly, this means that the courts have rejected ag-
gregate valuation, since attribution would be irrelevant if the
court were to consider the total value of the fee award under a
common and undivided interest rationale.120  As with the com-
mon law “common fund” cases, however, it appears that the fee
is taken out of the class’s recovery.121  Thus, it would make sense
to give such fee awards common and undivided interest status
117 See Davis , 182 F.3d at 796; see also Leonard , 279 F.3d at 974.  Alternatively,
some litigants have argued that “common benefit” fee awards, which are paid by the
defendant in addition to other damages when the litigation has conferred a public
benefit, constitute an aggregable common and undivided interest. See Smith , 236
F.3d at 1306; Davis , 182 F.3d at 795.  In both such cases, however, the court did not
reach the aggregation issue because it first found that common benefit fees were not
warranted.
118 See , e.g. , Grant v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 309 F.3d 864, 871-72 (5th Cir.
2002) (discussing LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 595(A)).  In Grant , the Fifth Circuit also
explained that, in addition to being a source of class counsel fees, article 595(A) also
acts to attribute the full amount of such fees to the lead plaintiff, including situations
where there is a separate statute that generally authorizes fees in that type of case in
single-plaintiff suits. Id.  at 876; see also In re  Abbott Labs., Inc., 51 F.3d 524, 526-27
(5th Cir. 1995) (attributing full amount of fees recoverable under LA. REV. STAT.
§ 51.137 to lead plaintiff because of operation of Article 595(A)).
119 See Grant , 309 F.3d at 872-73; Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 942 (9th
Cir. 2001) (discussing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5).
120 Although the Ninth Circuit did not discuss whether the fee at issue was sepa-
rate and distinct or common and undivided, it explicitly rejected aggregate valuation
in Gibson  by holding that the statutory class counsel fee had to be prorated among
all members of the class. See Gibson , 261 F.3d at 943.
121 See Grant , 309 F.3d at 872 (“[W]e assume arguendo  that art. 595(A) does not
authorize the court to assess attorneys’ fees to the class action defendant; rather,
that only the common “fund” or the other “benefits” made available to the class by
the class representatives’ litigation are eligible sources of such fees.” (emphasis
added)).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\82-2\ORE202.txt unknown Seq: 25  1-MAR-04 8:57
Diversity Class Actions, Common Relief, and the Rule of Individual Valuation 319
only where the underlying substantive claims would so qualify.122
C. Injunctive Relief
Litigants also have argued that class claims for injunctive relief
should be valued in the aggregate.  The intersection of the aggre-
gation rules and the valuation of injunctive relief can be particu-
larly tricky.  First, class claims for injunctive relief have an
inherent commonality to them.  When a defendant’s bad behav-
ior affects many people—as it presumably did in the context of a
class action—all of them have a common interest in altering that
behavior, and “the granting of equitable relief to one or more
class members is bound to affect the group as a whole.”123  Sec-
ond, the federal courts are split on whether to value injunctive
relief based on the benefit to the plaintiff or on the cost to the
defendant.124  The courts that value injunctive relief based on the
cost to the defendant have struggled with whether “defendant
viewpoint” valuation in class actions constitutes a de facto form
of aggregation.
The aggregation analysis is simplest when the court values the
claim for injunctive relief according to the benefit that the de-
sired injunction would confer on the plaintiff.125  When the plain-
tiff is a class, the courts have consistently held that they may look
to the total class-wide benefit only if the substantive rights giving
rise to the injunctive remedy are common and undivided.126
Thus, as with class claims for punitive damages, the courts look
past both the joinder mechanism and the nature of the remedy
and focus on whether the underlying substantive rights satisfy the
common and undivided interest exception for claim aggregation.
Where they do not, each individual member must show that the
desired injunction would yield a benefit to him of more than
122 See supra  notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
123 Shapiro, supra  note 65, at 925.
124 See supra  notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
125 According to one leading treatise, “[t]he majority of federal courts have cho-
sen to use the plaintiff viewpoint rule.”  15 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra
note 10, § 102.109[3].  Even within this framework, however, the courts sometimes
disagree over how to calculate the value of particular types of benefits that the in-
junction might confer. See  14B FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra  note
23, § 3708.
126 See  Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1309-10 (11th Cir. 2001) (no aggrega-
tion of injunctive relief where underlying fraud claims were separate and distinct);
Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1271 (11th Cir. 2000) (no aggrega-
tion of injunctive relief where underlying insurance claims were separate and dis-
tinct); Burns v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 820 F.2d 246, 250 (8th Cir. 1987) (same).
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$75,000.127
The aggregation analysis is much trickier in jurisdictions that
recognize the “either viewpoint” rule, which measures the
amount in controversy by either the benefit to the plaintiff or the
harm to the defendant.128  Obviously, the either viewpoint rule is
more liberal, since it would grant diversity jurisdiction based on
the value of the harm to the defendant in cases where the value
of the benefit to the plaintiff would not satisfy the amount in
controversy requirement.  While the either viewpoint approach
may better implement diversity jurisdiction in general,129 it is
problematic in the class action context because, strictly followed,
the harm to the defendant equals the cost of complying with an
injunction running to each and every class member.  As one trea-
tise puts it, “[t]o view the jurisdictional amount from the view-
point of the cost to the defendant in these cases would be to open
the back door to the federal courthouse to claims that are other-
wise barred by the nonaggregation rule.”130
The federal circuits started to address this potentially gaping
end run around the non-aggregation rule almost immediately af-
ter Snyder .  In 1970, the Tenth Circuit held that a “total detri-
ment” value could be used only where the court first determined
that the plaintiffs had a common and undivided interest leading
them to seek the same injunctive relief, lest “[t]he doctrine of
Snyder  . . . be so easily evaded.”131  In 1977, the Ninth Circuit
followed Lonnquist  and refused to allow defendant viewpoint
valuation of a class claim for injunctive relief where the class
members’ rights were separate and distinct on the basis that, in
127 See Smith , 236 F.3d at 1310.
128 See  15 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra  note 10, § 102.109[4].
129 See  McInnis, supra  note 49, at 1033-34 (arguing that the either viewpoint rule
better implements the purposes underlying diversity jurisdiction); see also  15
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra  note 10, § 102. 109[3] (“One may reasonably
question whether the plaintiff viewpoint rule legitimately fosters the purposes
served by the jurisdictional minimum.”).
130 15 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra  note 10, § 102.109[6]; see generally  2
HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 6.11 (3d ed.
1992) (discussing defendant viewpoint valuation under section entitled “Ways to
Avoid Snyder  and Zahn”).
131 Lonnquist v. J.C. Penney Co., 421 F.2d 597, 599 (10th Cir. 1970).  That same
year, the Eighth Circuit rejected defendant viewpoint valuation in class actions alto-
gether, also to preserve Snyder ’s rule of non-aggregation. See  Mass. State Pharma-
ceutical Ass’n v. Fed. Prescription Serv., Inc., 431 F.2d 130, 132 n.1 (8th Cir. 1970).
See generally  Note, Closing the Courthouse Door:  The Aftermath of  Snyder v. Har-
ris, 68 NW. U. L. REV. 1011, 1017-18 (1974) (discussing defendant viewpoint valua-
tion as possible mitigation of Snyder).
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that context, “‘[t]otal detriment’ is basically the same [thing] as
aggregation.”132  Since then, every circuit court to have ad-
dressed the issue has agreed that, in class actions, defendant
viewpoint valuation is a de facto form of aggregation.133  Accord-
ingly, the defendant-viewpoint courts will consider the total cost
to the defendant only where the class members’ underlying
claims giving rise to the injunction request are aggregable under
Snyder  and the common and undivided interest test.134
D. Restitution
Finally, litigants have argued that courts should employ aggre-
gate valuation in equitable suits for restitution, typically where
the class alleges unjust enrichment and seeks an order requiring
the defendant to disgorge the ill-gotten gains.135  The federal
132 Snow v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.2d 787, 790 (9th Cir. 1977).
133 See  Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 859-60 (9th Cir. 2001); In re
Ford Motor Co./Citibank (S.D.), 264 F.3d 952, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2001); In re  Brand
Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 610 (7th Cir. 1997); Packard
v. Provident Nat’l Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1050 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[A]llowing the amount
in controversy to be measured by the defendant’s cost would eviscerate [Snyder ’s]
holding that the claims of class members may not be aggregated in order to meet the
jurisdictional threshold.”).
134 See In re Ford , 264 F.3d at 959; Packard , 994 F.2d at 1050 & n.14.  The Ninth
Circuit, however, has suggested that Snow  articulated a rule to prevent end runs
around Snyder  in cases seeking money damages, such that it might allow total detri-
ment valuation of class claims seeking genuine injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2).
See Kanter , 265 F.3d at 860.
135 There is a rich literature arguing that the current “law of restitution” conflates
the concepts of restitution, unjust enrichment, and disgorgement. See  Symposium,
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment , 79 TEX. L. REV. 1763 (2001).  The debate coin-
cides with the American Law Institute’s efforts to draft an updated restatement of
the law in this area. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST EN-
RICHMENT (Discussion Draft, Mar. 31, 2000).  One of the issues that intersects with
diversity jurisdiction is whether current restitution law properly differentiates situa-
tions where the plaintiff’s recovery should be based on the defendant’s gains (dis-
gorgement) versus the plaintiff’s own losses (restoration). See  James J. Edelman,
Unjust Enrichment, Restitution, and Wrongs , 79 TEX. L. REV. 1869, 1870 (2001) (ar-
guing that failure to differentiate between unjust enrichment and restitution leads
courts to conflate disgorgement and restoration remedies); Andrew Kull, Disgorge-
ment for Breach, the “Restitution Interest,” and the Restatement of Contracts , 79 TEX.
L. REV. 2021, 2022-23 (2001) (discussing the problem of conflating restoration and
disgorgement in breach of contract context); see also  Colleen P. Murphy, Misclassi-
fying Monetary Restitution , 55 SMU. L. REV. 1577, 1580 (2002) (arguing that misun-
derstanding of restitution has led courts to categorize restoration damages as
restitutionary).  In the context of claim valuation, however, the federal courts are—
or at least ought to be—agnostic bystanders to that debate.  Diversity jurisdiction
takes state law as it finds it. See  Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 352-
53 (1961) (in diversity, federal courts “look to state law to determine the nature and
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courts have demonstrated a certain skepticism regarding these
claims, oftentimes viewing them as an attempt to evade Snyder
by recasting a “separate and distinct” monetary damages claim
into a “common and undivided” equitable claim.136  As with
claims for punitive damages, one of the most influential decisions
has been the Second Circuit’s opinion in Gilman , wherein the
court rejected aggregation of a class restitution claim based on its
overarching rule that “what controls is the nature of the right
asserted, not whether successful vindication of the right will lead
to a single pool of money that will be allocated among the plain-
tiffs.”137  Many courts follow the Gilman  test and value a class
action based on the total amount of monies to be disgorged only
if the class members held their underlying substantive rights in
common.138  Several district courts, however, have rejected
Gilman  and instead view class claims for disgorgement as inher-
ently common and undivided.139
III
THE CURRENT METHODS FOR VALUING COMMON RELIEF
CLAIMS WHEN THE UNDERLYING RIGHTS ARE SEPARATE
AND DISTINCT
Once the federal courts rejected—or, more accurately, se-
extent of the right to be enforced”).  Thus, whether state law is making normative
errors in choosing between plaintiff loss or defendant gain as the measure of dam-
ages is immaterial.  Whatever rule the state employs, the federal court must accept it
as the “correct” and controlling rule.
136 See  Crawford v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 267 F.3d 760, 766 n.3 (8th Cir.
2001); Del Vecchio v. Conseco, Inc. 230 F.3d 974, 977-78 (7th Cir. 2000).
137 Gilman v. BHC Sec., Inc., 104 F.3d 1418, 1427 (2d Cir. 1997).
138 See Crawford , 267 F.3d at 766; In re Ford , 264 F.3d at 961; Gibson v. Chrysler
Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 945-46 (9th Cir. 2001); Del Vecchio , 230 F.3d at 978; see also
McCoy v. Erie Ins. Co., 147 F. Supp. 2d 481, 491 (S.D. W. Va. 2001); Aetna U.S.
Healthcare, Inc. v. Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1050 (D. Kan.
1999).
139 See  Durant v. Servicemaster Co., 147 F. Supp. 2d 744, 750 (E.D. Mich. 2001);
In re  Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 90 F. Supp. 2d 819, 828-29 (E.D. Mich. 1999);
Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft, 48 F. Supp. 2d 37, 42
(D.C. Cir. 1999).  There is a parallel line of demarcation based on whether the un-
derlying substantive restitution law allows an individual plaintiff to obtain disgorge-
ment of the defendant’s entire ill-gotten gains or instead limits the plaintiff to
seeking only the amounts he unjustly paid to the defendant. See infra  notes 193-98
and accompanying text.  In general, where an individual plaintiff may only recover
his own overpayments, the courts have not found the class to have a common and
undivided interest in restitution. See , e.g. , Pope v. Indep. Order of Foresters, No.
3:01CV-626-S, 2001 WL 1733606 (W.D. Ky. July 23, 2002) (no common and undi-
vided interest where plaintiff can only recover his own overpayments).
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verely limited—aggregation of class claims for common relief,
they found that their valuation job was only beginning.  To be
precise, once a court rejects aggregate valuation of any particular
claim brought by the class, it must then determine the value of
that claim for each class member separately.  Moreover, when
there are multiple non-aggregable class claims, the court must
calculate a separate class member value for each of those claims.
Thus, when a class action presents a variety of non-aggregable
claims, the court must conduct a series of separate valuations to
yield “per class member” values for each claim, which are then
added to each class member’s individual compensatory damages
claim to determine each class member’s total amount in contro-
versy.140  This Part describes the methods the courts have devel-
oped to value the various common relief claims when they are
separate and distinct, and therefore non-aggregable.
A. Punitive Damages
The most common method of calculating the per class member
value of a class claim for punitive damages predicated on sepa-
rate and distinct individual rights is to divide the value of the
class-wide punitive damages by the number of class members.
While only the Eleventh Circuit has explicitly adopted pro rata
valuation as its customary method of individually valuing class
claims for punitive damages,141 at least two other circuits—the
Fifth and the Ninth—have implicitly adopted pro rata valua-
tion.142  Moreover, district courts in at least five other circuits
140 See  Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1271 (11th Cir. 2000) (ad-
ding individual class members’ claims for compensatory damages with their prorated
share of attorneys’ fees and their prorated share of punitive damages); Spann v.
Style Crest Prods., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 605, 611 (D.S.C. 2001) (“The amount in
controversy includes each individual plaintiff’s claim for compensatory damages, any
punitive damages award divided pro rata per plaintiff, and the cost of injunctive
relief for each plaintiff.”).
141 See  Leonard v. Enter. Rent a Car, 279 F.3d 967, 972 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[F]or
amount in controversy purposes a class punitive damages claim must be allocated
pro rata  to each class member.”).  Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit seems to conclude
that pro rata valuation is the natural and inexorable consequence of a court’s belief
that the class members’ underlying claims are non-aggregable. See  Cohen v. Office
Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069, 1073 (11th Cir. 2000) (“If the single punitive damages
claim cannot be attributed as a whole to each class member, it must be allocated or
divided pro rata  among the class members”); see also Morrison , 228 F.3d at 1264
(“Instead of being aggregated . . . the amount of punitive damages must be divided
equally among all of the class members to determine the proper amount in contro-
versy for each member.”).
142 See Gibson , 261 F.3d at 945 (rejecting defendants request that the court value
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have employed pro rata valuation on at least one occasion to
value class punitive damage claims.143
Pro rata valuation operates most clearly and visibly when the
court knows both the value of the class claim and the number of
plaintiffs in the class.  In those cases, the court can actually “do
the math” and determine a precise figure to allocate to each class
member.  In Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc. , for example, the com-
plaint sought class-wide punitive damages in the amount of ten
million dollars.144  Dividing this amount by the 39,000 class mem-
bers, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the prorated per class
member value of the punitive damages claim was just $256.145
In many cases, though, the court lacks a precise figure—or
even an estimate—for either the numerator (the total value of
the class claim for punitive damages) or the denominator (the
size of the class).  In those cases, the courts often extrapolate a
prorated per class member amount in controversy.146  In Smith v.
GTE Corp. , for example, the class complaint did not seek a spe-
the case based on “the totality of punitive damages, rather than the per-plaintiff
share”); Ard v. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp., 138 F.3d 596, 602 (5th Cir. 1998)
(following Lindsey v. Alabama Telephone Co. , 576 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1978), which
itself implicitly adopted pro rata valuation).  The district courts in both the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits certainly have understood these decisions as requiring them to pro-
rate the value of class claims for punitive damages. See , e.g. , Ecker v. Ford Motor
Co., No. 02-CV-6833, 2002 WL 31654558, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2002) (finding no
basis to conclude that the pro rata value of class punitive damages satisfied the juris-
dictional amount).
143 See  Freitas v. First N.H. Mortgage Corp., No. 98-211ML, 1998 WL 657606, at
*6 (D.R.I. July 23, 1992) (First Circuit); McIntyre v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
No. CIV. A. 01-3476, 2001 WL 893697, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2001) (Third Circuit);
Spann , 171 F. Supp. 2d at 609; Garbie v. Chrysler Corp., 8 F. Supp. 2d 814, 819 (N.D.
Ill. 1998) (Seventh Circuit); Radmer v. Aid Ass’n for Lutherans, No. 99-0961-CV-W-
9-4, 2000 WL 33910093, at *5 (W.D. Mo. April 7, 2000) (Eighth Circuit).
144 204 F.3d at 1077.
145 Id.
146 Occasionally, the courts do not even bother to perform the extrapolations on
the basis that the prorated amounts necessary to meet the jurisdictional amount are
so far-fetched that it is not necessary to perform precise calculations. See Leonard ,
279 F.3d at 973, noting:
Although both the size of the class and the amount of damages sought were
left undefined by the defendants, making it impossible for us to perform
the precise calculation, we can conclude that without the benefit of aggre-
gation, defendants would be unable to carry their burden of proof that the
punitive damages are likely to exceed $75,000.
See also  Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1306 (11th Cir. 2001) (concluding, with-
out calculations, that an attorney’s fee award prorated “to each of the more than
36,000 class members would be well under $75,000”).
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cific amount of class-wide punitive damages.147  The court was
able to estimate the size of the class at approximately 36,000 class
members, however, and it knew that the average class members
had less than $2,000 in compensatory damages.148  Calculating
that each class member would need to recover $73,000 in pro-
rated punitive damages to satisfy the jurisdictional amount, the
court found that the required total punitive damages award of
$2.6 billion would violate the Due Process Clause and therefore
was “not possible as a matter of law.”149  The most graphic exam-
ple is perhaps Morrison v. Allstate Indemnity Co. , in which the
plaintiff’s complaint sought punitive damages against Allstate
based on Allstate’s practice of not compensating policyholders
for the diminished resale value of a repaired vehicle.150  Estimat-
ing the size of the class at over one million persons, the court
noted that a “good faith” punitive damages claim of 100 million
dollars would still prorate to just $100 per class member.151
A second method courts have used to calculate per class mem-
ber values for class punitive damages claims is to attribute to
each class member the full amount of damages claimed by the
class as a whole.  The leading—and perhaps only152—example of
this is the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Allen v. R&H Oil & Gas
Co.153  The Allen  case is often cited as the first case allowing the
aggregation of claims for punitive damages, since it did find that
all 512 joined plaintiffs satisfied the amount in controversy re-
147 236 F.3d at 1300.
148 Id.  at 1304.
149 Id.  (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996)).
150 Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1265 (11th Cir. 2000).
151 Id.  The court added: “Even a one billion dollar punitive damages claim,
which could hardly be asserted in good faith, would amount to less than [$1,000] for
each class member.” Id.  For another extrapolation, see Kirkland v. Midland Mort-
gage Co. , in which the court held that the $700 million punitive damages claim it
would take for the 9,400 class members to each reach $75,000 was “inconceivable
under the circumstances.”  243 F.3d 1277, 1281 (11th Cir. 2001). See also  Garbie v.
Chrysler Corp., 8 F. Supp. 2d 814, 819 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (holding that forty-five million
dollars in punitive damages required to yield sufficient prorated damages would be
excessive as a matter of law).
152 One district court has held that the full amount of punitive damages may be
attributed to each putative class member when the complaint phrases the demand
for punitive damages as a collective right. See  Knauer v. Ohio State Life Ins. Co.,
102 F. Supp. 2d 443, 449 (N.D. Ohio 2000).  This test differs from the Allen  test,
however, which looks to the nature of punitive damages under the applicable state
law, rather than the plaintiff’s style of pleading.
153 Allen v. R&H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326 (5th Cir. 1995).
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quirement based on the class claim for punitive damages.154  But,
as discussed earlier, Allen  did not arrive at that result through
aggregation.155  Rather, the Fifth Circuit held that, under Missis-
sippi law, “each plaintiff has an integrated right to the full
amount of [a punitive damages] award.”156  Thus, “no aggrega-
tion—meaning the addition of separate claims—is necessary.”157
The Fifth Circuit, however, has essentially limited the rule of full
individual attribution to punitive damage claims under Missis-
sippi law.158
B. Attorneys’ Fees
As with punitive damages, courts rarely find that attorneys’
fees are a common and undivided interest that can be aggregated
to satisfy the jurisdictional amount.159  Thus, the class members
may rely only on the value of attorneys’ fees individually attribu-
table to them.  In turn, this requires courts to calculate a per class
member value for attorneys’ fees when they are sought on behalf
of a plaintiff class.  Two methods have emerged.
The most common method is for courts to prorate the value of
the class-wide fee claim among all members of the class.  This
method is particularly prevalent where each class member could
have sued individually under a statute that also allowed them to
recover attorneys’ fees if they won.160  Courts also prorate the
154 See supra  notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
155 See supra  notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
156 Allen , 63 F.3d at 1333-34.
157 Id.  at 1334-35.
158 See , e.g. , H&D Tire & Automotive-Hardware Inc. v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 250
F.3d 302, 304-05 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Allen  was limited—by the panel that decided it—
to the unique circumstances of Mississippi law.”); Ard v. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line
Corp., 138 F.3d 596, 602 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Allen  departs from Lindsey  solely because
of the peculiar nature of punitive damages under Mississippi law”).
159 See supra  notes 110-22 and accompanying text.
160 See  Crawford v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 267 F.3d 760, 766-67 (8th Cir.
2001) (deceptive trade practices act allowing individual suit and awarding fees to
“any person who suffers actual damage or injury”); Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co.,
265 F.3d 853, 859 (9th Cir. 2001) (consumer fraud act allowing individual suit and
awarding fees to “prevailing party”); Spielman v. Genzyme Corp., 251 F.3d 1, 8-9
(1st Cir. 2001) (consumer fraud act allowing individual suit and awarding fees to the
“petitioner”); Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069, 1080 (11th Cir. 2000) (con-
sumer fraud act allowing individual suit and awarding fees to “prevailing party”);
Darden v. Ford Consumer Fin. Co., 200 F.3d 753, 758 (11th Cir. 2000) (state RICO
act allowing individual suit and awarding fees to “any person who is injured”);
Talalai v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., No. 00CV5694AJL, 2001 WL 1877265, at *3
(D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2001) (consumer fraud act allowing individual suit and awarding fees
to “prevailing party”).
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value of “common fund” attorneys’ fee awards,161 which necessa-
rily belong to the class as a whole—and not to named plaintiffs
alone—because they are deducted from the class-wide damages
recovery.162
Because class actions involve large numbers of plaintiffs, the
per class member value of prorated attorneys’ fees will almost
certainly be too small to push any class members over the
$75,000 jurisdictional threshold.163  As with punitive damages,
courts sometimes use extrapolations to demonstrate this point.
In Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc. , for example, the Eleventh Circuit
noted that, since each plaintiff had on average only $260 in com-
pensatory damages, each would need to identify almost $75,000
in individually-attributable attorneys’ fees to meet the amount in
controversy requirement.164  But, because the class contained
39,000 members, it would take $2.9 billion in attorneys’ fees to
give each plaintiff a prorated $75,000, a result the court under-
statedly characterized as “not possible.”165
The other method courts have used is to attribute the full
amount of the class-wide fees to the named plaintiff, but attribute
no amount to the absent class members.  The courts have em-
ployed this valuation method where the claim for attorneys’ fees
is based on a statute that authorizes an award of fees to “the
representative parties” in a class action that generates a common
recovery or benefit.166  Under Louisiana law, this includes cases
where the class members individually would have had a right to
fees.167  In general, though, the courts seem to disfavor this
161 See  Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1306 (11th Cir. 2001).
162 See  Davis v. Carl Cannon Chevrolet-Olds, Inc., 182 F.3d 792, 795 (11th Cir.
1999).
163 See  Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1268 (11th Cir. 2000)
(“[G]iven the plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the size of the subclass, the portion
attributed to each member would be minimal.”); Perotti v. Black & Decker (U.S.),
Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d 813, 819 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (prorated fees would be at most
$1,000 per class member).
164 Cohen , 204 F.3d at 1083 & n.16.
165 Id.
166 See In re  Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524, 526 (5th Cir. 1995) (Louisiana fee statute);
see also  Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 251 F.3d 1284, 1293 n.7 (10th Cir. 2001)
(acknowledging that full amount of attorneys’ fees might be allocated to named
plaintiffs if fee statute expressly awards them to the class representatives); 15
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra  note 10, § 102.108[4][c] (“[I]f the statute
awards attorney’s fees to the named plaintiff in a class action, the fees are attributa-
ble solely to the class representative.”).
167 See  Grant v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 309 F.3d 864, 876 (5th Cir. 2002)
(“When a separate, specific Louisiana law provides for the award of attorney’s
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method, and instead have prorated the class fee—even when the
right to fees existed solely because the action sought class re-
lief—where the fee statute did not specifically identify the class
representative as the recipient of those fees.168
C. Injunctive Relief
As discussed above, the circuits strictly limit aggregate valua-
tion of class claims for injunctive relief to those cases where the
class members derived their individual claims from the same
right or title.169  Thus, in most class actions seeking injunctive re-
lief, the Snyder  rule prevents the individual class members from
relying on the total value of class-wide injunctive relief sought.
Instead, the class members must show that their own separate
claims—including their claims entitling them to injunctive re-
lief—meet the amount in controversy requirement.  As a result,
courts must calculate a per class member value for non-aggre-
gable class claims for injunctive relief.
Calculating a per plaintiff value for class-wide injunctive relief
is easiest—and most straightforward—in those jurisdictions that
value injunctive relief solely from the viewpoint of the plain-
tiff.170  Under the plaintiff viewpoint rule, the value of the claim
is based on “what the plaintiff will recover or avoid losing if the
suit is successful.”171  Stated otherwise, the value of injunctive re-
lief is “the monetary value of the benefit that would flow to the
plaintiff if the injunction were granted.”172
Where the benefit flowing from the requested injunction
seems sufficiently concrete, courts have calculated specific pre-
sent values of that relief for the class members.  In Smith v. GTE
Corp. , for example, the court calculated that the maximum
fees . . . art. 595(A) requires all such fees to be . . . aggregated and attributed to the
class representatives”).
168 See  Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 942-43 (9th Cir. 2001) (common
fund fee statute that awarded fees to the “successful party” did not direct that they
be attributed in full to the named plaintiffs); H&D Tire & Automotive-Hardware,
Inc. v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 227 F.3d 326, 330 (5th Cir. 2000) (where statute allowed
class fees “to the plaintiff,” the “use of the word ‘plaintiff’ . . . does not dictate that
any fee award must be attributed solely to the representative party in a class
action”).
169 See supra  notes 123-34 and accompanying text.
170 For a discussion of how the various circuits value injunctive relief, see supra
notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
171 15 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra  note 10, § 102.109[3].
172 Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069, 1077 (11th Cir. 2000).
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amount of money any class member might hope to save as a re-
sult of an injunction that would order the phone company to
cease imposing excessive lease charges was $7,200, reduced to
present value.173  More commonly, however, the courts have de-
clared the value to be zero for all class members on the basis that
the benefits were either too speculative or simply had no mone-
tary value.174
What is perhaps most significant about these cases, however, is
what the courts are not doing—they are not prorating.  In Smith ,
the court did not take the total monetary benefit of the injunc-
tion and divide it, but instead it determined per class member
value by calculating the maximum monthly benefit “[a]s to any
individual class member” over the life of the injunction.175 The
absence of prorating is most pronounced in Morrison v. Allstate
Indemnity Co.176  In that case, the plaintiff class claimed that All-
state’s policy language required it to compensate policy holders
for the diminished value of repaired cars, and the class sought an
injunction that would obligate Allstate to pay such claims in the
future.177  The court concluded that the per class member value
was zero because it was “simply impossible to know which class
members will be involved in automobile accidents” in the future
and that the value of any such claims was “equally uncertain.”178
When discussing (and rejecting) aggregate valuation, though, the
court acknowledged that, given a class of over one million policy-
holders, the present value of all future diminished value claims
would exceed $75,000.179  Thus, had the court used pro rata valu-
ation, it could have estimated the value of the future benefits that
would accrue to the class as a whole and then divided that
amount by the number of class members, yielding a small but
positive number for all class members.
Individual valuation of class claims for injunctive relief is trick-
ier in those jurisdictions where the courts can value injunctive
relief from the viewpoint of the defendant.  In the context of a
class action, pure defendant viewpoint valuation would mean
173 Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1309 (11th Cir. 2001).
174 See  Leonard v. Enter. Rent a Car, 279 F.3d 967, 973 (11th Cir. 2002); Cohen ,
204 F.3d at 1077.
175 236 F.3d at 1309.
176 Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1270 (11th Cir. 2000).
177 Id.  at 1268.
178 Id.  at 1269.
179 Id.  at 1270.
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that the value of the case would be the cost to the defendant of
complying with an injunction running to the entire class.  As dis-
cussed above, all of the circuit courts in the defendant viewpoint
jurisdictions that have addressed the issue have held that pure
defendant viewpoint valuation in class actions would be a form of
de facto aggregation,180 and therefore do not allow it except
where the underlying substantive claims are common and undi-
vided such that they could be aggregated under Snyder .181
Having concluded that they could not value the case based on
the cost of complying with class-wide injunctive relief, these
courts then had to find an alternative method of valuation.  One
approach has been to simply reject defendant viewpoint valua-
tion in class actions and require that class claims for injunctive
relief be valued from the plaintiff’s perspective only.182  More
commonly, however, the courts have allowed defendant view-
point valuation but adjusted it to account for the de facto aggre-
gation effect.  Some courts adjust by prorating the defendant’s
costs among the class members.183  The Seventh and Ninth Cir-
cuits, however, take a fundamentally different approach, and cal-
culate the individual value of the case based on the cost to the
defendant of an injunction running to a single plaintiff.184  In
other words, the jurisdictional value is determined by hypothesiz-
180 See supra  notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
181 Compare In re  Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 90 F. Supp. 2d 819, 836 (E.D.
Mich. 1999) (valuing injunctive relief in aggregate based on finding that plaintiffs
had common and undivided interest); Edge v. Blockbuster Video, Inc., 10 F. Supp.
2d 1248, 1253 (N.D. Ala. 1997) (same), with In re  Ford Motor Co./Citibank (S.D.),
264 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2001); In re  Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust
Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 610 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that class members had individual
rights to relief rather than an undivided right); Packard v. Provident Nat’l Bank, 994
F.2d 1039, 1050 n.14 (3d Cir. 1993) (discussing and rejecting common and undivided
interest aggregation).
182 See  Mass. State Pharm. Ass’n v. Fed. Prescription Serv., Inc., 431 F.2d 130, 132
n.1 (8th Cir. 1970) (finding that plaintiff viewpoint is “the only valid rule” in class
actions in light of Snyder); Nelson v. Assocs. Fin. Servs. Co., 79 F. Supp. 2d 813, 818
(W.D. Mich. 2000).
183 See  Mattingly v. Hughes Elecs. Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d 694, 698 (D. Md. 2000);
Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1051
(D. Kan. 1999); see also  McIntire v. Ford Motor Co., 142 F. Supp. 2d 911, 925 (S.D.
Ohio 2001) (although finding itself limited to plaintiff viewpoint, stating that in the
alternative it would prorate defendant viewpoint costs).
184 See In re Ford , 264 F.3d at 959; In re Brand Name Drugs , 123 F.3d at 610; see
also  Spann v. Style Crest Prods., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 605, 611 (D.S.C. 2001) (“[T]he
amount in controversy with respect to the injunctive relief is the cost to defendants
of providing notification to each plaintiff.”); In re  Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig.,
127 F. Supp. 2d 702, 719 & n.16 (D. Md. 2001).
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ing how much the proposed injunction would cost the defendant
if sought by an individual class member .
For the courts that value class claims according to the cost to
the defendant of a hypothetical single-plaintiff injunction, a
troublesome question remains regarding what items to include
when calculating the cost to the defendant.  In the Ninth Circuit’s
In re Ford  case, for example, the plaintiff class sought an injunc-
tion ordering Ford and Citibank to reinstate a credit card rebate
program.185  Ford and Citibank, who were opposing a remand
motion, argued that the jurisdictional amount was satisfied, even
when valued as the cost to the defendant of an injunction run-
ning to a single plaintiff, because “the fixed costs to Ford and
Citibank of reinstating and maintaining the [rebate] program
would be the same whether it is done for one plaintiff or for six
million.”186  The court rejected this argument, explaining that if
“the administrative costs of complying with an injunction were
permitted to count as the amount in controversy, ‘then every
case, however trivial, against a large company would cross the
threshold.’”187  In an opinion issued just four days later, a differ-
ent panel of the Ninth Circuit also rejected valuation based on
the defendant’s compliance costs, holding that they simply were
not a proper element of the amount in controversy when the pri-
mary object of the case was to secure monetary damages rather
than injunctive relief.188
In both Ford  and Kanter , the decision to not count internal
compliance costs as part of the amount in controversy was critical
to the conclusion that the value of a “single plaintiff injunction”
was below the jurisdictional amount.  One need only look to the
District of Maryland’s decision in In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust
Litigation  to see the impact of including those types of costs in
185 See In re Ford , 264 F.3d at 958.
186 Id.  at 960.
187 Id.  at 961 (quoting In re Brand Name Drugs , 123 F.3d at 610).  The Seventh
Circuit reached the same conclusion, but in dicta. See In re Brand Name Drugs , 123
F.3d at 610 (suggesting it would not count “a defendant’s clerical or ministerial costs
of compliance” but adding that it “needn’t bite this bullet” because the defendants
failed to create a record for such a calculation).
188 See  Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 858 (9th Cir. 2001); see also
Post v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 01 CIV.9410 TPG, 2002 WL 1203847, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2002) (rejecting GM’s argument that the cost to comply with an
injunction to stop committing fraud included GM’s internal cost to redesign that
particular vehicle in a suit alleging fraud based on sale of car with defective brakes).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\82-2\ORE202.txt unknown Seq: 38  1-MAR-04 8:57
332 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82, 2003]
the amount in controversy.189  In that case, the class sought a
mandatory injunction ordering Microsoft to offer unbundled op-
erating software.190  Following Gilman  and Brand Name Drugs ,
the court valued each class member’s injunctive relief separately
based on the cost of an injunction running in favor of one plain-
tiff to avoid running afoul of the non-aggregation rule of Sny-
der .191  Even so, the court found the value of each single
plaintiff’s injunctive relief to exceed $75,000 because “the im-
mense cost to Microsoft of accomplishing this untying would be
the same whether it is done for one plaintiff or for millions.”192
D. Restitution
While a few decisions hold that restitution claims are inher-
ently aggregable because the class members have a common and
undivided interest in the defendant’s ill-gotten gains, most courts
follow Gilman  and allow aggregate valuation only in the rare sit-
uations where the class members held the substantive rights un-
derlying the restitution claim in common prior to the lawsuit.193
Thus, in most cases, the court must calculate a per class member
value for the class-wide restitution claim.  Unfortunately, none of
the circuit court decisions has then proceeded to actually calcu-
late a per class member value for the class restitution claim at
issue.
In the district courts, the operative rule seems to be that the
per class member value of a class claim for restitution is the
amount each class member could have obtained had he or she
litigated separately.  This amount can vary drastically depending
on the underlying state substantive law.  In some circumstances,
the substantive law would permit a plaintiff suing individually to
recover all of the defendant’s ill-gotten gains.194  In this situation,
189 127 F. Supp. 2d at 719.
190 Id.  at 718.
191 Id.  at 719.
192 Id.  The court previously had found that redesigning its operating software to
comply with the requested injunction “would cost millions of dollars.” Id.  at 718.
See also  Jackson v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., No. 01-2113 DA, 2001 WL 34048067, at
*5 (W.D. Tenn. April 3, 2001) (finding, in suit seeking injunction for medical moni-
toring, jurisdictional amount met because “the clerical and administrative costs of
such a program alone would certainly exceed $75,000”).
193 See supra  notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
194 According to one treatise, one of the defining characteristics of restitution is
that it “measures the remedy by the defendant’s gain and seeks to force disgorge-
ment of that gain.”  1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.1(1) (2d ed. 1993).
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the per class member value of the restitution claim would be the
entire amount of the unjust benefit obtained by the defendant.195
At other times, the applicable state substantive law might limit a
plaintiff’s recovery to those sums that the defendant unlawfully
obtained from him personally.196  In that situation, the per class
member value of the restitution claim is limited to what that
plaintiff personally overpaid to the defendant.197  Some of the
circuit court opinions also hint at valuing restitution based on
what each class member personally overpaid.198
IV
THE RULE OF INDIVIDUAL VALUATION
Taken together, Parts II and III of this Article demonstrate
that while the valuation of class claims for common relief appears
uniform on the surface, it is turbulent underneath.  On the sur-
face, the circuit courts now uniformly limit common and undi-
vided interest aggregation to situations where the class members
hold the rights underlying the class claim jointly.  As a result,
most class action common relief claims are ultimately valued on a
class member by class member basis.  But when the time comes
for the courts to actually calculate per class member values, they
adopt vastly divergent ways of doing it.
This Part considers how these divergent valuation methods
compare with the established principles of claim valuation.  The
dominant principle underlying multi-party claim valuation—in-
cluding most examples of so-called “aggregate” valuation—is
195 See In re Microsoft , 127 F. Supp. 2d at 720.
196 See  McCoy v. Erie Ins. Co., 147 F. Supp. 2d 481, 491 (S.D. W. Va. 2001) (“The
class members . . . stand to recover only the amount of excessive premiums each
paid under his or her own policy.”).
197 See id. ; Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft, 54 F. Supp.
2d 1042, 1050 (D. Kan. 1999); see also  Pope v. Indep. Order of Foresters, No.
3:01CV-626-S, 2002 WL 1733606, at *2 (W.D. Ky. July 23, 2002) (class members
seeking only those unearned premiums he or she paid, rather than comprehensive
disgorgement of all profits).
198 See , e.g. , Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 945 (9th Cir. 2001) (referenc-
ing the $6 to $16 of profit per vehicle Chrysler obtained by using a substandard
electrocoating technique because “[t]hat sum can be traced to particular transactions
involving individual plaintiffs, each of whom can sue Chrysler for disgorgement of
this per-vehicle profit”) (emphasis added); Gilman v. BHC Secs., Inc., 104 F.3d 1418,
1426 (2d Cir. 1997) (interpreting the class complaint as seeking a “collective demand
by class members for the disgorgement of order flow payments received in respect of
their individual transactions , as accurately as that amount can be calculated”) (em-
phasis added).
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that the value of any particular plaintiff’s case against any partic-
ular defendant is measured by what that plaintiff could have ob-
tained had he or she sued the defendant alone.199  This Article
refers to this principle as the “rule of individual valuation.”
Upon reexamination, it can be seen that some of the existing
forms of separate and distinct claim valuation already follow the
rule of individual valuation.  Others do not, however, with “pro
rata” valuation being the method that departs most drastically.
A. The Rule of Individual Valuation
It is hornbook law that when parties join as co-plaintiffs, they
may aggregate the value of their claims if the claims are “com-
mon and undivided,” but they may not do so if their claims are
“separate and distinct.”200  The near universal opinion is that this
valuation scheme is a relic from the 1800s that has little relevance
to modern pleading and practice.201  The Supreme Court, how-
ever, has been quite clear in its view that, because Congress legis-
lates against the Court’s interpretation of the diversity statute, it
is up to Congress to make any change.202  Until Congress exer-
cises that power, it seems appropriate to scrutinize the existing
scheme—however flawed it may be—to see if it imparts any prin-
ciples that might inform the valuation of new categories of
claims.  As a whole, the existing valuation scheme evidences one
dominant principle—that the courts assess the value of any one
plaintiff’s claims against any one defendant based on what rights
that plaintiff has vis-a-vis that defendant, without regard to the
related rights of others.  This Article refers to this principle as the
rule of individual valuation.
The rule of individual valuation operates openly and clearly in
cases where the joined plaintiffs’ claims are deemed to be sepa-
rate and distinct.  Most commonly, this principle is stated as a
negative:  “It is a familiar rule that when several plaintiffs assert
199 See infra  notes 200-21 and accompanying text.
200 See CHARLES A. WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
§ 36, at 213 (6th ed. 2002).
201 See  15 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra  note 10, § 102.108[3][b]; see also
14B FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra  note 23, § 3704, at 127 (referring
to the valuation rules as “unsatisfactory,” “haphazard[ ],” and “mystifying.”).  Even
those commentators who have found rational explanations for these rules in the
history of federal pleading and practice agree that the dichotomy between “sepa-
rate” and “common” claims is a difficult one to apply in modern times. See  Ren-
sberger, supra  note 57, at 927.
202 See  Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 339 (1969).
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separate and distinct demands in a single suit . . . those amounts
cannot be added together to satisfy jurisdictional require-
ments.”203  Stated positively, the principle holds that when the
interests of joined plaintiffs are separate and distinct, the court
must value them individually.204 Any plaintiff who individually
does not possess rights against the defendant in the requisite
amount must be dismissed from the suit.205
On the surface, the courts appear to act contrary to the rule of
individual valuation when they value common and undivided
claims in the aggregate to satisfy the jurisdictional amount re-
quirement.206  As the Supreme Court put it most recently in
Zahn , “when several plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title or
right, in which they have a common and undivided interest, it is
enough if their interests collectively  equal the jurisdictional
amount.”207  This language implies that the court is adding the
value of their individual claims to see if their sum exceeds the
jurisdictional amount.208  Thus, according to the standard ac-
count, when the claims of joined plaintiffs spring from a common
and undivided interest, the total value of that interest controls
because it is the sum  of their individual interests.
A rule that values each plaintiff’s claim based on the “total”
value of the interest at stake, however, is not inherently inconsis-
tent with the rule of individual valuation.  Indeed, when parties
truly hold their rights in common, it is the term “aggregation”
that seems to be the misnomer.  Traditionally, the terms “com-
mon” and “undivided” have referred to property interests in
which several parties have joint and equal but not exclusive
203 Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 589 (1939).
204 See id.  (concluding that the plaintiffs claims were separate and distinct and
then examining the record to determine how much each plaintiff separately could
recover from the defendant).
205 See id.  at 590; see also  Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 300 (1973)
(“[A]ny plaintiff without the jurisdictional amount must be dismissed from the case,
even though others allege jurisdictionally sufficient claims.”).
206 See Snyder , 394 U.S. at 335 (“Aggregation has been permitted only . . . in cases
in which two or more plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title or right in which they
have a common and undivided interest.”); see also  15 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE,
supra  note 10, § 102.108[3][b]; 14B FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra
note 23, § 3704, at 128.
207 414 U.S. at 294 (emphasis added).
208 See  14B FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra  note 23, § 3704, at 145
(“the claims of the coparties have been added together in determining whether the
statutory amount in controversy requirement has been satisfied”).
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rights to the whole.209  The paradigm examples come from the
law of real property; one of the defining characteristics of “ten-
ancy in common” and “joint tenancy” is unity of possession,
whereby the co-owners “share a single right to possession of the
entire interest.”210  Thus, as Professor Rensberger noted, “when
the substantive law gives multiple plaintiffs joint ownership, the
plaintiffs do not need aggregation” because each plaintiff individ-
ually has a claim to the whole vis-a-vis the outsider-defendant.211
Accordingly, when courts use the total value of jointly-held
rights, they do so not by adding the value of each plaintiff’s
claim, but by giving each plaintiff full credit for his claims and
not dividing that amount just because other persons indepen-
dently can assert the same rights.
The same dynamic is evident when a single plaintiff sues multi-
ple defendants.  Under the standard account, a plaintiff cannot
aggregate the value of his claims against multiple defendants
when the claims are separate and distinct, but may do so when
“the plaintiff’s claims against the defendants are common and
undivided so that the defendant’s liability is properly character-
ized as joint and not several.”212  The defining characteristic of
209 The Supreme Court first applied the aggregation doctrine in the context of
district court jurisdiction in 1911. See  Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S.
39 (1911).  At that time, Black’s Law Dictionary defined the word common as
“shared amongst several; owned by several jointly.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 226
(2d ed. 1910).  It defined the word undivided as follows: “An undivided right or
title, or a title to an undivided portion of an estate, is that owned by one of two or
more tenants in common or joint tenants before partition.” Id.  at 1185.  Those defi-
nitions survive to this day. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 275 (6th ed. 1990) (defin-
ing common to include “shared among several; owned by several jointly”); id.  at
1527 (defining undivided right as “that owned by one of two or more tenants in
common or joint tenants before partition”).
210 See  7 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 50.01[1] (Michael
Allan Wolf ed., 2000) [hereinafter 7 POWELL] (tenancy in common); id.  § 51.03[2]
(joint tenancy).
211 See  Rensberger, supra  note 57, at 960.  While the rights of co-tenants as to
third parties are clear, the ability of a single co-tenant to bring an action against an
outsider is not.  Most jurisdictions, for example, allow a single tenant in common to
sue for the entire estate in an action for ejectment or possession.  7 POWELL, supra
note 210, § 50.06[1].  In other contexts, however, courts may not allow a single ten-
ant to proceed alone, or may only allow the single tenant to recover his or her pro-
portionate share of damages. See id.
212 See  15 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra  note 10, § 102.108[2]. In ex-
tending aggregation principles to joined defendants, the Supreme Court stated that
“when two or more defendants are sued by the same plaintiff in one suit, the test of
jurisdiction is the joint or several character of the liability to the plaintiff.”  Walter v.
Northeastern R.R. Co., 147 U.S. 370, 373 (1893). Compare  Morrison v. Am. Online,
Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 930, 935 (N.D. Ind. 2001) (“When liability among defendants is
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joint and several liability, however, is that the plaintiff may look
to any of the tortfeasors for the entire amount of damages.213
Thus, here too, in suits against joined defendants who are jointly
and severally liable, valuing the case based on the total liability is
not a rule of addition but a rule of non-division.214  Specifically,
the court does not divide the total liability by the number of de-
fendants present because, vis-a-vis the plaintiff, each of them re-
mains liable for the entire amount.
The principle of individual valuation also helps to explain cases
that value “in the aggregate” when the law vests the rights of
several in a single plaintiff.  Shareholder derivative suits, for ex-
ample, are valued based on the damage asserted to have been
sustained by the corporation, rather than the potential recovery
of the shareholder who initiated the suit.215  This result seems
consistent with the rule of individual valuation, however, since
the initiating shareholder is vindicating the rights of the company
itself , and not its own or those of the other shareholders.216  Simi-
larly, the Supreme Court has valued cases according to the total
amount of a trust or estate, rather than the amounts held by indi-
vidual beneficiaries or distributees, when the claim was against
the trust or estate itself.217  At its furthest extreme, the Supreme
Court has used “aggregate” valuation where the underlying sub-
several, a plaintiff cannot aggregate its claims against individual defendants in order
to satisfy the jurisdictional amount.”) and  Bajowski v. Sysco Corp., 115 F. Supp. 2d
133, 139 (D. Mass. 2000) (“Plaintiff also may not aggregate her claim regarding the
automobile with those against other defendants in order to reach the required diver-
sity amount, because the claims are separate, and not joint and several.”), with  Hay-
field v. Home Depot U.S.A., 168 F. Supp. 2d 436, 447, 452 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (using
aggregate value after finding that negligence claim against one defendant and inten-
tional tort claim against other defendant created joint and several liability under
applicable state law) and  Winner’s Circle of Las Vegas, Inc. v. AMI Franchising,
Inc., 916 F. Supp. 1024, 1028 (D. Nev. 1996) (using aggregate value after finding that
defendants were acting in concert, so that liability for fraud/conversion was joint and
several).
213 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 (1979) (“Each of two or more
persons whose tortious conduct is a legal cause of a single and indivisible harm to
the injured party is subject to liability to the injured party for the entire harm.”).
214 See  Rensberger, supra  note 57, at 960 (“Because each defendant under the
substantive law of torts is liable for the whole amount, the plaintiff does not need to
resort to aggregation.”).
215 See  Koster v. (Am.) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 523-24 (1947).
216 Id.  at 522; see also  Franklin A. Gevurtz, Corporation Law § 4.3.1 (2000) (dis-
cussing the nature of derivative suits).
217 See  Bullard v. City of Cisco, 290 U.S. 179, 188-89 (1933) (using total value in
suit to recover on bonds where claim resided in ‘trust’ of which the individuals were
secondary beneficiaries); Shields v. Thomas, 58 U.S. 3, 4-5 (1855) (using total value
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stantive law prescribed a single action that could be “brought by
all of the parties interested, or by any one of them for the benefit
of all.”218
The purpose of this discussion, however, is not to rewrite the
law of aggregation, nor is it to claim that every case involving
“aggregate” valuation is actually a disguised case of the individ-
ual valuation of joint and several rights.  While the Supreme
Court certainly has emphasized the difference between joint
rights and several rights as the fundamental factor underlying the
aggregation rules,219 it has never explicitly stated that it was
“non-dividing” instead of adding.  Indeed, in many cases, it is im-
possible to determine whether the Supreme Court thought it was
dealing with a truly joint right—that is, one in which each plain-
tiff could recover the whole—or just one that it deemed aggre-
gable due to its common origin.220  Moreover, most of the
of loss to estate rather than amounts that individual might receive upon its distribu-
tion in a suit against estate administrator for conversion).
218 See  Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Gentry, 163 U.S. 353, 361 (1896). But see  William
H. Theis, Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co.:  The Non-Aggregation Rule in Jurisdictional
Amount Cases , 35 LA. L. REV. 89, 106 (1974) (reading Gentry  as an application of
compulsory joinder rather than as a case involving joint substantive rights).
219 See  Gibson v. Shufeldt, 122 U.S. 27 (1887) (reviewing its past decisions in vari-
ous contexts and emphasizing the distinction in each application between joint rights
and several rights). Compare  Green County v. John Thomas’s Executor, 211 U.S.
598, 600 (1909) (where plaintiffs held bonds “jointly,” “each plaintiff owned an undi-
vided interest in all the bonds and coupons in suit”), with  Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S.
594, 596 (1916) (plaintiffs “severally entitled to the same shares” in an estate did not
have common and undivided interest).
220 See , e.g.,  Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39 (1911).  In that
case, a man named Eigenmann sold land to Whitehead for a total of $6,000, of which
$2,400 would be paid later.  Troy Bank v. Whitehead, 184 F. 932, 933 (W.D. Ky.
1910). Whitehead gave Eigenmann one promissory note in the amount of $1,200
payable in 12 months, and another promissory note in the amount of $1,200 payable
in 24 months. Id.  Under the law of Kentucky, however, Eigenmann also obtained
an equitable vendor’s lien in the full amount of the unpaid portion—$2,400. Troy
Bank , 222 U.S. at 40. See generally  2 LEONARD A. JONES, THE LAW OF LIENS
§ 1061 (3rd ed. 1914) (discussing nature of vendor’s lien); id.  § 1074 (lien exists even
when buyer gives promissory note).  Eigenmann later transferred those notes to two
different parties, who later joined together to sue Whitehead when he failed to pay
on the notes. Troy Bank , 222 U.S. at 40.  Importantly, the current holders did not
sue at law on the notes themselves, but instead sued in equity to enforce the ven-
dor’s lien that passed to them with the notes. Id.  at 40-41.  The Supreme Court
acknowledged that, had they sued on the notes, their claims would not have been
aggregable. Id.  at 41.  But the Supreme Court held that “their claim  under the ven-
dor’s lien was single and undivided” such that the full $2,400 value of the lien satis-
fied the jurisdictional amount. Id.  (emphasis added).  At the time, the law was clear
that, as between themselves, concurrent note holders shared the value of an assigned
vendor’s lien pro rata , but that the note holders otherwise received a pro tanto  as-
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Supreme Court cases that used an “aggregate” value were de-
cided at a time when the pleading rules generally required joint
interest holders to sue together,221 rendering any attempt to un-
derstand them according to the individual value of the plaintiffs’
claims at best a hypothetical exercise.
Rather, the far more modest purpose of this discussion is to
see if the existing valuation scheme—as a whole—yields an or-
ganizing principle that might guide us when valuing the claims of
individual class members when the aggregation rules say we can-
not use the total value of the suit.  In other words, how should
courts value the individual claims of class members when those
claims are non-aggregable but nevertheless seek substantially
overlapping relief?  In this regard, I think the evidence is suffi-
cient to conclude that the dominant principle—applied explicitly
with separate and distinct claims and implicitly with most com-
mon and undivided interest claims—is that the amount in contro-
versy is the value of the claims that any single plaintiff could
assert against any single defendant in a suit in which they were
the only parties.
B. Re-Examining the Current Methods for Valuing Common
Relief Claims
In Part III, this Article detailed the various methods the fed-
eral courts have used to calculate a “per plaintiff” value when a
class asserts separate and distinct claims for common relief.222
Here, this Article reexamines those methods in the light of the
rule of individual valuation.
1. Punitive Damages
Predominantly, courts prorate class punitive damages
claims.223  In other words, the class members only receive
amount in controversy credit for a prorated share of the total
signment of the vendor’s lien. See JONES, supra  at § 1097.  In the end, though,
neither the text of Troy Bank  nor the contemporary authorities provide conclusive
evidence as to whether the assignees to the vendor’s lien held their interests jointly
in the sense that each had an undivided right to pursue the whole amount of the lien,
subject to an accounting to the other.
221 See  Rensberger, supra  note 57, at 934.  Indeed, one of the primary criticisms of
the current valuation scheme is that it is a vestige of common law pleading. See  15
MOORE*APOS;S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra  note 10, § 102.108[3][b]; 14B FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra  note 23, § 3704, at 150.
222 See supra  notes 140-98 and accompanying text.
223 See supra  notes 141-51 and accompanying text.
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punitive damages claim.224  The question, then, is how prorating
compares to a punitive damages claim valuation based on what
the individual class members might have claimed in punitive
damages had they sued on their own.  While the law of punitive
damages is not sufficiently definite to allow any blanket conclu-
sions, in general it appears that prorating undervalues punitive
damages relative to the rule of individual valuation.
We begin by revisiting the law of punitive damages.  Punitive
damages are not compensation for harm but serve instead to
punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its recurrence.225  The
focus is on the defendant, not the plaintiff.  Thus, typically, courts
first look to characteristics of the defendant, such as the nature of
the misconduct and the defendant’s wealth, when determining
how large of an award is necessary to achieve the goals of punish-
ment and deterrence.226  Moreover, details regarding the defen-
dant’s wrongdoing play a critical role in determining whether a
punitive damages award is consistent with due process.227  As the
Supreme Court recently stated, “[t]he most important indicium
of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree
of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.”228  However, pu-
nitive damages awards are not wholly divorced from characteris-
tics of the plaintiff.  In particular, a punitive damages award must
be “proportionate to the amount of harm to the plaintiff and to
the general damages recovered.”229  Thus, while the focus of a
punitive damages analysis is decidedly on the defendant and the
224 See  Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1271 (11th Cir. 2000) (ad-
ding individual class members’ claims for compensatory damages with their prorated
share of attorneys’ fees and their prorated share of punitive damages); Spann v.
Style Crest Prods., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 605, 611 (D.S.C. 2001) (“The amount in
controversy includes each individual plaintiff’s claim for compensatory damages, any
punitive damages award divided pro rata per plaintiff, and the cost of injunctive
relief for each plaintiff.”).
225 See  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1519 (2003).
226 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979) (listing factors rele-
vant to size of punitive damages award); MODEL PUNITIVE DAMAGES ACT § 7(a)
(1996), (same); see also supra  notes 86-88 and accompanying text (discussing puni-
tive damage factors).
227 The Supreme Court now recognizes both procedural and substantive due pro-
cess constraints on the imposition of punitive damages. See State Farm , 123 S. Ct. at
1519; Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432-33
(2001); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996); TXO Prod. Corp. v.
Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 (1993).
228 State Farm , 123 S. Ct. at 1521.
229 Id.  at 1524.
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details of its wrongdoing, the characteristics of the plaintiff, such
as the nature and severity of his injuries, cannot be ignored.
We can now turn to comparing prorated punitive damages,
which entail calculating a punitive damages claim on behalf of
the class and then dividing, with a punitive damages award val-
ued from the perspective of a single plaintiff.  The first thing to
note is that the punitive damages factors that are based on the
defendant’s characteristics should not vary.  In particular, the
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct will be the same
whether the plaintiff is a class or a single plaintiff, as will the
defendant’s wealth.  And, since our scenario is predicated on the
possibility of a class action, it is likely that the defendant’s con-
duct was not an isolated event but rather involved a larger course
of conduct and affected many people, thereby placing it higher
on the “reprehensibility” scale.230  While the Supreme Court has
held that courts may consider only related acts of wrongdoing
when considering reprehensibility,231 that is likely to be satisfied
in a proposed class action.  Thus, a potential class member suing
separately should be able to make the same case for reprehensi-
bility and wealth as a lead plaintiff suing on behalf of a class.
The situation starts to show variance, however, when it comes
to the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages.  Since the be-
ginning of its foray into due process limitations on punitive dam-
ages, the Supreme Court has refused to identify any
mathematical formula for when a punitive damages award vio-
lates due process.232  While the Supreme Court again declined to
fix a bright-line ratio in its most recent punitive damages case,
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell , it did
230 See id.  at 1521 (listing as a factor whether the conduct involved repeated ac-
tions or was an isolated incident); Gore , 517 U.S. at 576-77 (“Certainly, evidence
that a defendant has repeatedly engaged in prohibited conduct while knowing or
suspecting that it was unlawful would provide relevant support for an argument that
strong medicine is required to cure the defendant’s disrespect for the law.”); see
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979) (listing factors rele-
vant to size of punitive damages award); MODEL PUNITIVE DAMAGES ACT § 7(a)
(1996) (same).
231 See State Farm , 123 S. Ct. at 1523.
232 See Gore , 517 U.S. at 582 (“[W]e have consistently rejected the notion that the
constitutional line is marked by a simple mathematical formula”); Pac. Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991) (“We need not, and indeed we cannot, draw a
mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitu-
tionally unacceptable that would fit every case.”).  The states similarly eschew any
bright-line ratios for excessiveness. See  2 KIRCHER & WISEMAN, supra  note 80,
§ 18.6.
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chalk a single-digit ratio of punitive to compensatory damages as
a presumptive boundary.233  It then reflected on what effect the
size of the denominator—compensatory damages—has on the
permissible ratio.  On the one hand, a small denominator might
justify exceeding the presumptively-bounded single-digit ratio.234
But, conversely, a large denominator—i.e., “[w]hen compensa-
tory damages are substantial”—might cap the ratio at one-to-
one.235  In short, the constitutional ratio of punitive to compensa-
tory damages rests on a sliding scale that tends towards one-to-
one when compensatory damages are large, but may exceed sin-
gle-digits when compensatory damages are small.236
The size of compensatory damages, as the denominator, can
cause a disparity between individually-valued punitive damages
and prorated punitive damages in two ways.  First, a court might
calculate excessiveness based on the ratio of punitive damages to
the total harm  the defendant caused or intended to cause,237 or
233 State Farm , 123 S. Ct. at 1524 (“[I]n practice, few awards exceeding a single-
digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will
satisfy due process.”).  Several courts had rather presciently predicted a presumptive
ten-to-one limit. See  Cont’l Trend Res., Inc. v. OXY USA Inc., 101 F.3d 634, 639
(10th Cir. 1996) (adopting presumptive limit of ten-to-one ratio); see also In re  Si-
mon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86, 165 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (discussing de facto ten-to-one
ration “where compensatory damages are generous”); In re  Exxon Valdez, 236 F.
Supp. 2d 1043, 1063 (D. Alaska 2002) (reading TXO  and prior Ninth Circuit prece-
dent as accepting ten-to-one ratio as general limit); Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Stevens, 783
So. 2d 804, 811 (Ala. 2000) (remitting punitive damages award from thirty-to-one
ratio to ten-to-one).
234 See State Farm , 123 S. Ct. at 1524.  This language suggests the continued per-
missibility of ratios in the area of twenty-to-one, at least when compensatory dam-
ages are small. See  Schaffer v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 552 N.W.2d 801, 811 (S.D.
1996) (upholding thirty-to-one ratio of $25,000 in compensatory damages and
$750,000 in punitive damages); Lister v. Nationsbank of Del., N.A., 494 S.E.2d 449,
459 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding twenty-three-to-one ratio of $8,600 in compen-
satory damages and $200,000 in punitive damages).  It may signal the demise, how-
ever, of decisions that permitted punitive damage ratios exceeding fifty-to-one. See
Parrott v. Carr Chevrolet, Inc., 17 P.3d 473, 489 (Or. 2001) (upholding eighty-seven-
to-one ratio of $12,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000,000 in punitive dam-
ages); Union Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Crocker, 709 So. 2d 1118, 1122 (Ala. 1997) (up-
holding sixty-two-to-one ratio of $16,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000,000
in punitive damages).
235 State Farm , 123 S. Ct. at 1524.
236 See also Gore , 517 U.S. at 582.  As one commentator explains, “there appears
to be kind of a ‘sliding-scale’ approach to ratio in [post-Gore] cases” based on indi-
vidual loss, potential loss, and overall reprehensibility.  Mark A. Klugheit, “Where
the Rubber Meets the Road”:  Theoretical Justifications vs. Practical Outcomes in Pu-
nitive Damages Litigation , 52 SYRACUSE L. REV. 803, 834 (2002).
237 See Gore , 517 U.S. at 581 (comparing punitive damage award to the single
plaintiff’s damages and  to the damages sustained by all of the Alabama victims);
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the defendant’s total gain  from a course of misconduct.238  That
prospect seems less likely after State Farm ; when discussing rep-
rehensibility the Court expressed concerns about considering
harm to others, specifically noting the risk of multiple punish-
ment.239  More directly, the Court’s discussion of the ratio prong
consistently referred to the harm to the plaintiff and the compen-
satory damages recovered by the plaintiff.240  Nevertheless, State
Farm , like the previous decisions, does not specifically identify
what figure is to be the denominator in the ratio calculation.  To
the extent total harm theory remains viable, it is hard to imagine
a class-action-type situation where the total harm caused by the
defendant (or the total gain reaped by the defendant) could not
support a punitive damages recovery of more than $75,000.241
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 460 (1993) (“It is appropriate
to consider the magnitude of the potential  harm that the defendant’s conduct would
have caused to its intended victim . . . as well as the possible harm to other victims
that might have resulted if similar future behavior were not deterred.”); see also
Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Thomas M. Sobol, Equity for the Victims, Equity for the
Transgressor:  The Classwide Treatment of Punitive Damages Claims , 74 TUL. L.
REV. 2005, 2020 (2000) (“Taken in context, [Haslip , TXO , and Gore] imply a due
process limitation on the ultimate quantum of punitive damages awarded against a
party for one cause of wrongdoing, but not in the form of a precise relationship
between an individual plaintiff’s actual damages and a punitive damages award.”);
Laura J. Hines, Obstacles to Determining Punitive Damages in Class Actions , 36
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 889, 935-36 (2001) (discussing Supreme Court’s failure “to
hold definitively which measure should be used”).  For a recent criticism of total
harm punitive damages, see Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment
Problem: Punitive Damages as Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs , 87 MINN.
L. REV. 583, 650-57 (2003) (arguing that total harm punitive damages are
unconstitutional).
238 See  Davis v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., No. CIV-96-2070-T, 2000 WL 1140302
(W.D. Okla. June 2, 2000) (comparing $17 million punitive damage award to defen-
dant’s total $17 million gain, rather than the plaintiff’s $439 in economic damages);
see generally  Amanda L. Maxfield, Punitive Damages: Cooper Industries v.
Leatherman Tool Group:  Will a Constitutional Objection to the Excessiveness of a
Punitive Damages Award Save Defendants from Oklahoma’s Punitive Damages Stat-
ute? , 55 OKLA. L. REV. 449, 478 & n.232 (discussing the Oklahoma statute at issue in
Davis  and citing to similar statutes in other states).
239 State Farm , 123 S. Ct. at 1523.
240 Id.  at 1524.
241 It is true that, even if any single  plaintiff could predicate punitive damages on
total harm, due process might preclude all  of them from doing so. See  1 KIRCHER &
WISEMAN, supra  note 80, §§ 5.26-5.27 (discussing problem of multiple awards).
Thus, some might argue that each class member’s individually-valued claim would
have to be discounted by the fact that punitive damage awards may be reduced to
avoid cumulative awards. See MODEL PUNITIVE DAMAGES ACT § 10 (1996) (“Mul-
tiple Awards for Same Act or Course of Conduct”); see also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS §§ 908 cmt. e (1979) (acknowledging need to factor in prior awards,
and possibly anticipated future awards).  Certainly, to the extent that prior awards
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What remains a more realistic source of disparity is the effect
of the size of compensatory damages on the ratio.  In a class ac-
tion, the amount of compensatory damages is likely to be sub-
stantial, suggesting that the class-wide punitive damages will tend
towards the one-to-one ratio.  Since that award is prorated, each
plaintiff stands to receive punitive damages in an amount roughly
equal to his compensatory damages.  If one of those class mem-
bers were to sue separately, however, the amount of his individ-
ual compensatory damages is likely to be small.  This would
suggest that the permissible ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages would tend towards, or potentially exceed, the ten-to-
one ratio.  That plaintiff would then stand to receive punitive
damages in an amount ten times his compensatory damages. In
sum, pro rata valuation undervalues class member punitive dam-
ages claims because it assumes that the same ratio applicable to
the group claim would apply to a single plaintiff claim.
To illustrate the problem, imagine a case in which a phone
company overcharges 100,000 customers $10 per month for a
year.  Each class member will have incurred $120 in compensa-
tory damages, with total class-wide damages of $12,000,000.  Fur-
ther assume that, in valuing this claim, a court concludes that
punitive damages of up to $24 million would be warranted (based
on the nature of the wrongdoing and the defendant’s wealth) and
would not be excessive (representing only a two-to-one ratio of
punitive to total compensatory damages).  Under a pro rata valu-
ation scheme, each plaintiff’s share of that claim would be $240.
How would that compare to a suit by a single plaintiff?  If ex-
cessiveness is measured by each plaintiff’s own compensatory
damages,242 then the full $24 million punitive damage award is
clearly excessive.  But would $240—the prorated amount—accu-
exist, the court should factor them in the same as if the individual class member
were an individual plaintiff.  When determining jurisdictional value, however, the
court should not discount the value of each class member’s punitive damages claims
by the fact that other class members exist.  The operating principle is to hypothesize
a single-plaintiff suit for every class member and then apply the prevailing valuation
rules.  Until other potential claimants obtain a judgment—which the other class
members obviously have not yet done—one cannot say to a “legal certainty” that
the value of any one class member’s claim is subject to discount for being
cumulative.
242 If excessiveness is measured against the total harm caused by the defendant,
then each plaintiff, suing on his own, could have obtained the full $24,000,000 and
still show a due process-friendly two-to-one ratio.  For the reasons discussed earlier,
however, the “total harm” punitive damages award may be foreclosed by State
Farm . See supra  notes 237-40 and accompanying text.
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rately reflect the upper limit of a punitive damages claim brought
by a single victim?  At the very least, we might think that a court
would deem a $2,400 punitive damage claim (ten-to-one ratio) to
be legally plausible under these circumstances.  In that case, the
pro rata rule would have undervalued the class member’s puni-
tive damage claim by 900%.  To drive the point further, if the
single plaintiff sought just $10,000 in punitive damages as punish-
ment for the phone company’s widespread fraud—an amount
that at best would just begin to achieve meaningful punishment
or deterrence—would a court say that it was unavailable as a le-
gal certainty because the ratio would be eighty-three to one?
In the end, prorating is likely to depart from the rule of indi-
vidual valuation because it is based on questionable math.  It
uses simple division to calculate class member punitive damage
values despite the absence of any clear linear relationship be-
tween the size of a punitive damages award and the number of
plaintiffs in a suit.243  As a result, it undervalues each class mem-
ber’s separate claim for punitive damages relative to what that
class member could have claimed if he were a solo plaintiff. This
discrepancy—in which punitive damages claims count for less in
class actions than they do in single plaintiff suits—constitutes a
jurisdictional penalty on class action joinder.
Ironically, the only method of valuing punitive damages that
conforms to the rule of individual valuation is the Fifth Circuit’s
much-maligned method of valuing punitive damages under Mis-
sissippi law.244  In Allen v. R&H Oil & Gas Co. , the court held
243 Indeed, it is precisely this overlap that has led to the development of the so-
called “limited punishment” or “limited generosity” class action, under which a
court would certify a limited fund class action under Rule 23(b)(1) not because the
prospect of successive punitive damage awards would bankrupt the defendant, but
because state law or due process limits on successive punitive damage awards exter-
nally define the maximum total amount of punitive damages that a defendant would
have to pay for any particular event or transaction. See  Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Un-
finished Business:  Reaching the Due Process Limits of Punitive Damages in Tobacco
Litigation Through Unitary Classwide Adjudication , 36 Wake Forest L. Rev. 979,
1030 (2001); Joan Steinman, Managing Punitive Damages:  A Role for Mandatory
“Limited Generosity” Classes and Anti-Suit Injunctions? , 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1043, 1075 (2001); see , e.g. , In re  Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86, 184-86 (E.D.N.Y.
2002) (certifying “limited punishment” punitive damages class action against to-
bacco companies).  If individual plaintiffs’ punitive damage awards did not overlap
with the potential awards of others similarly-situated, then there would be no basis
for a “limited punishment” class action because the constitutional maximum would
not be reached until the last plaintiff prevailed.
244 At least one group of plaintiffs has unsuccessfully advanced the argument.  In
Smith v. GTE Corp. , the Eleventh Circuit held that, given the class size of 36,000,
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that, “because of the collective scope of punitive damages and
their nature as individual claims under Mississippi law,” each
plaintiff could invoke the full amount of the group’s punitive
damages claim in satisfaction of the amount in controversy re-
quirement.245  One possible reading of this case is that it values
the punitive damages claim in the aggregate.  The better reading
of Allen , however, is that the court interpreted Mississippi law to
provide that the amount that any individual could obtain in puni-
tive damages was identical to the amount that the group could
obtain.246  In other words, the court followed the rule of individ-
ual valuation by attributing the total value of the group’s punitive
damages claim to each plaintiff because that is what it believed
each would have had in controversy had they brought separate
actions.
2. Attorneys’ Fees
In many class action fee cases, the source of the fee award is a
fee-shifting statute that allows prevailing plaintiffs to recover
their fees from the defendant.  When a statute requires the de-
fendant to pay the plaintiff’s fees, the size of the fee typically is
calculated according to the “lodestar” method, which sets fees by
multiplying the number of hours the attorney reasonably ex-
pended on the case by the attorney’s reasonable hourly rate.247
Thus, the class fee award that the defendant pays is a function of
prorated punitive damages would be too small to satisfy the jurisdictional amount.
236 F.3d 1292, 1304 (11th Cir. 2001).  The plaintiffs responded by arguing that, had
the class members proceeded separately, they could have recovered a large enough
sum to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement. Id.  at 1304 n.12.  The court,
however, refused to consider the value of their “hypothetical” individual suits:
“Perhaps, but this suit was filed as a class action and until the class certification is
denied, we must treat it as a class action.” Id.
245 Allen v. R&H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1335 (5th Cir. 1995).
246 See supra  notes 103-109 and accompanying text.  To the extent Allen  properly
construes Mississippi punitive damages law to allow single victims to recover puni-
tive damages irrespective of their personal injuries, however, it seems unlikely that
result would withstand scrutiny under State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell ,
123 S. Ct. 1513, 1524 (2003) (imposing presumption ten-to-one ratio for punitive
damages award).
247 See  7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at Law  § 306 (1997).  The lodestar method is the
dominant approach to determining a reasonable fee under fee-shifting statutes. See
1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.10(10(1) (2d ed. 1993).  Indeed, the Su-
preme Court proclaims the lodestar method as “the guiding light of [its] fee-shifting
jurisprudence.”  City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992).  While state
practices can and will differ, they generally track the developments in the federal
case law.  Russell E. Lovell, II, Court-Awarded Attorneys’ Fees 2 (1999).
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the number of hours class counsel works on the case.  In this situ-
ation, the courts consistently prorate the class fee.248  In so doing,
however, the courts make the same math error they make when
prorating punitive damage awards.
While it almost certainly takes more time to represent a class
than it does to represent a single plaintiff, the difference is not a
direct multiple of the number of plaintiffs.249  Stated otherwise,
because of economies of scale, there is no linear relationship be-
tween the hours needed to litigate a class action and the number
of plaintiffs in the class.  For example, just because 100 hours
would be reasonable in a single plaintiff suit does not mean that
100,000 hours would be reasonable in an otherwise identical class
action with 1000 plaintiffs.  But it is just as absurd to conclude—
as pro rata fee valuation implicitly does—that, because 500 hours
might represent the reasonable hours limit in a class action with
1000 plaintiffs, a single plaintiff bringing an otherwise identical
action could reasonably recover for only one-half hour of attor-
ney time.  As a result, when a court prorates fees available to the
class members under a substantive fee-shifting statute, it almost
certainly attributes to each class member an amount in fees much
smaller than what would have been a reasonable lodestar fee
award had that class member sued separately.250
248 See supra  notes 119-20 and accompanying text.  In theory, a court would ac-
complish this by determining how much in fees would be reasonable were the case
to proceed as a class action and then dividing that amount by the number of class
members.  In practice, however, the courts do not bother to actually calculate the
pro rata fees, instead concluding that there is no point doing so because each class
member’s share is bound to be minimal. See  Kirkland v. Midland Mortgage Co., 243
F.3d 1277, 1281 n.7 (11th Cir. 2001) (agreeing with plaintiffs that it could disregard
fees because, when prorated, they could not “significantly contribute to satisfaction
of the jurisdictional amount”); Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069, 1083
(11th Cir. 2000) (not calculating actual pro rata fees because it would take the “as-
tronomical” total of $2.9 billion in fees to yield prorated amounts sufficient to satisfy
the jurisdictional amount for each class member); see also  Morrison v. Allstate In-
dem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1274 (11th Cir. 2000) (remanding for fee calculation, but
noting that fees will not affect the jurisdictional amount because they will be very
small after being prorated).
249 Indeed, the Supreme Court has suggested that there might be no difference at
all. See  Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 900 & n.16 (1984) (noting lodestar calcula-
tion in class action would not be increased by fifty percent due to the fact that out-
come benefitted a large number of people because “[p]resumably, counsel will
spend as much time and will be as diligent in litigating a case that benefits a small
class of people, or, indeed, in protecting the . . . rights of a single individual”).
250 In Darden v. Ford Consumer Fin. Co. , for example, the court and parties as-
sumed that the class members could get claim a pro rata share of attorneys’ fees, and
that the pro rata amount would be insignificant.  200 F.3d 753, 756 (11th Cir. 2000).
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Applying the rule of individual valuation to common fund fees
is also problematic.  A common fund fee is really just an equita-
ble transfer by which absent class members pay lawyers they did
not hire themselves but who nonetheless secured them a recov-
ery.251  As such, it is a byproduct of group litigation.  Thus, it
makes little sense to ask what the common fund fee would have
been in a single-plaintiff suit because that hypothetical does not
exist.
Nevertheless, it is worth comparing some of the case results.
In the large majority of cases, the common fund fee is taken out
of the class recovery.252  The general rule is that fee awards are
not a part of the amount in controversy when they are paid by
the plaintiff rather than recovered from the defendant.253  In this
vein, the Eleventh Circuit does not count common fund fee
awards as part of the amount in controversy at all since, coming
out of the class’s damages recovery, they “[do] not enhance any
class member’s claim against the defendants.”254 In contrast, the
Fifth Circuit has held that, under Louisiana’s common fund fee
statute, fees that are deducted from the class recovery do count
towards the amount in controversy and are then attributable
solely to the representative plaintiffs for amount in controversy
purposes.255  While the Fifth Circuit relies on the text of the Lou-
In so doing, they overlooked the fact that the state RICO statute that provided for
fees in that case allows a prevailing plaintiff to recover lodestar fees regardless of the
size of the RICO judgment. See  Dee v. Sweet, 460 S.E.2d 110, 113 (Ga. Ct. App.
1995) (finding damages award of one dollar sufficient to sustain lodestar fees of
$258,000 because the fee award “is not contingent upon the amount of damages
awarded”).
251 See RAND/ICJ STUDY, supra  note 4, at 77.  In this respect, a common fund fee
award is analogous to “the way a plaintiff’s attorney may be compensated by a con-
tingent fee [in that] a plaintiff class pays its attorneys by sharing its recovery with
them.”  Skelton v. Gen. Motors Corp., 860 F.2d 250, 252 (7th Cir. 1988).
252 See supra  notes 114-17 and accompanying text.  Some statutes, however, cre-
ate a fee recovery based on the creation of a common fund and  shift the payment of
the fee to the defendant. See , e.g. , CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5; Edgerton v.
State Pers. Bd., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 491, 499 (Ct. App. 2000) (discussing operation of
§ 1021.5, including fee shifting and use of lodestar to calculate size of fee).  In Gib-
son v. Chrysler Corp. , the Ninth Circuit held that the value of these “private attor-
ney general” fees must be prorated among the class members.  261 F.3d 927, 942
(9th Cir. 2001).  In that situation, it does make sense to count the fees towards the
amount in controversy, since they add to rather than are subtracted from the class
recovery.  Still, the rule of individual valuation fails as a comparator because no class
member, on his own, could be in a position to seek such a fee award.
253 See  15 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra  note 10, § 102.106[6][a].
254 Leonard v. Enter. Rent a Car, 279 F.3d 967, 974 (11th Cir. 2002).
255 See  Grant v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 309 F.3d 864, 872-73 (5th Cir. 2002).
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isiana fee statute to explain why it would allocate the value of the
fees solely to the representative plaintiff, it fails to explain why it
counts such fees towards the amount in controversy at all, since
the source of the fees is not the defendant but the benefitted
class members or co-plaintiffs.256
While the decision whether to count fees towards the amount
in controversy at all does not, by itself, concern the difference
between pro rata and individual valuation, it does overlap in one
respect.  Under the Eleventh Circuit’s approach, it does not mat-
ter whether a claim is brought by an individual or a group—law-
yers’ fees ultimately borne by the plaintiffs do not count towards
the amount in controversy.  Under the Fifth Circuit’s approach,
however, suit structure does matter:  Single plaintiffs cannot
count the fees they pay towards the amount in controversy, but
group plaintiffs can—and they are attributed solely to the lead
plaintiff.  In conjunction with the Fifth Circuit’s ruling that the
supplemental jurisdiction statute overruled Zahn ,257 this turns
plaintiff-paid fees under the Louisiana statute into a significant
vehicle for class-wide federal subject matter jurisdiction.258
3. Injunctive Relief
Most federal courts actually conform  to the rule of individual
valuation when determining per plaintiff values for class claims
for injunctive relief.  The Seventh and Ninth Circuits, for exam-
ple, generally permit defendant viewpoint valuation but disavow
it in class actions as a form of de facto aggregation.259  Accord-
ingly, when the class members claims are separate and distinct
such that they are not aggregable under Snyder , the Seventh and
Ninth Circuits value the individual class members’ claims at the
cost to the defendant of an injunction running in favor of one
plaintiff.260  This valuation method has highlighted other valua-
The Louisiana statute provides as follows: “The court may allow the representative
parties their reasonable expenses of litigation, including attorney’s fees, when as a
result of the class action a fund is made available, or a recovery or compromise is
had which is beneficial, to the class.” LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 595(A) (West
2002).  As the Fifth Circuit noted, this statute is not restricted to common fund cases,
and can serve to force benefitted plaintiffs to use their own damages recoveries to
compensate the representative parties for their efforts. See Grant , 309 F.3d at 873.
256 See Grant , 309 F.3d at 872-73.
257 See In re  Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524, 528-29 (5th Cir. 1995).
258 See , e.g. , Grant , 309 F.3d at 873.
259 See, e.g., id.
260 See In re  Ford Motor Co./Citibank (S.D.), 264 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2001); In
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tion problems attendant to injunctions, such as whether to in-
clude various compliance costs that the defendant will incur
internally.261  But once the courts determine which of the defen-
dant’s costs to include, they are performing plaintiff-specific valu-
ations; in other words, the courts are not adding up the
defendant’s “countable” costs then dividing by the number of
class members, but instead appear to be asking how much it will
cost the defendant to comply with the injunction that any one of
them might pursue individually.262
The courts that value class claims for injunctive relief from the
plaintiff’s viewpoint also appear to be following the rule of indi-
vidual valuation.  In one case, the court valued a class claim to
enjoin a phone company’s fraudulent leasing practices at “the
present value of the future lease charges that the class members
could avoid” if the injunction were issued.263  The court then con-
cluded that the amount would be well below $75,000 “[a]s to any
individual class member” because the highest amount of charges
that any of the plaintiffs could incur—and therefore avoid via an
injunction—was still just $7,200.264  While the court was not ex-
plicit, it appeared to be using that calculation as a maximum fig-
ure to estimate and then deem insufficient the leasing charges
that any of the class members might have avoided through an
individual injunction.
Perhaps more telling, though, are the cases from the plaintiff-
viewpoint jurisdictions that refuse to attribute any  value of the
class claim for injunctive relief to individual class members on
the grounds that the court cannot know in advance whether any
particular class member would be in a position to reap the bene-
fits of the injunction at issue.  In Morrison v. Allstate Indemnity
Co. , for example, the plaintiff class sought an injunction that
would require Allstate to compensate class members for the di-
minished value on any future damaged vehicle claims.265  Apply-
re  Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 611 (7th Cir.
1997).
261 See supra  notes 185-92 and accompanying text.
262 See  Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 859 (9th Cir. 2001) (defen-
dant’s cost of complying with order preventing them from selling an ineffective drug
was the $9-$17 that any plaintiff had paid for it); In re Ford , 264 F.3d at 960 (defen-
dant’s cost of complying with specific performance of rebate program could be
worth “no more than $3,500” per individual program participant).
263 See  Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1309 (11th Cir. 2001).
264 Id.
265 Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1268 (11th Cir. 2000).  The
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ing the plaintiff-viewpoint rule, the court stated that the benefit
to the class members would be “the payment of any future claims
for diminished value, at least for as long as the policies at issue
remain in effect. . . .”266  Furthermore, the court acknowledged
that, across the class of policyholders, enough class members
would have accidents in the future such that the aggregate value
of their diminished value claims would exceed $75,000.267  How-
ever, the court concluded that the individual value of any partic-
ular class member’s claim was zero because it would be mere
speculation as to whether any particular member would have
such a claim in the future and, if so, for how much.268  This can
only be the result of true individual valuation; if the court were
prorating, it would have determined the total expected benefit
based on actuarial tables and divided that amount by the number
of class members, yielding a small—but positive—number for
everyone.
4. Restitution
Finally, although the circuit courts have not been clear in how
they value class claims for restitution when the underlying rights
are separate and distinct, the district courts appear to follow the
rule of individual valuation, even when reaching vastly different
outcomes.  One of the most striking examples of this is the Dis-
trict of Maryland’s decision in In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Lit-
igation .269  In this case, the court found the amount in
controversy requirement satisfied based on the full amount of ill-
gotten gains that the defendant would have to disgorge because,
under applicable state restitution law, any “individual plaintiff,
regardless of the particular damages he has suffered, might re-
cover the entire unjust benefit obtained by the defendant.”270
The court distinguished attributing the full value of restitution
available to any single plaintiff from aggregation:
If that is so as a matter of the applicable substantive law, it is
not clear to me why federal jurisdiction must be based upon
substance of the suit involved Allstate’s refusal to compensate policyholders for the
reduced resale value of repaired vehicles. Id.  at 1259.
266 Id.  at 1268.
267 Id.  at 1270.
268 Id.  at 1269.
269 See In re  Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 127 F. Supp. 2d 702, 720 (D. Md.
2001).
270 Id.
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the common and undivided interest exception to the non-ag-
gregation rule of Zahn  and Snyder .  Jurisdiction would then
be founded not upon the aggregation of the claims of different
plaintiffs but the single claim of any one of them.271
Thus, the district court explicitly recognized that it was not val-
uing the claim as a “common and undivided” interest, but instead
was determining the individual value of “separate and distinct”
class restitution claims by asking how much each plaintiff could
get if he had litigated on his own.
While most of the district courts have attributed to each plain-
tiff much less than the full disgorgement value of the class restitu-
tion claim, they too appear to be conducting a form of individual
valuation.  In some jurisdictions, for example, a restitution plain-
tiff may not receive the full amount of the defendant’s ill-gotten
gains, but rather is limited to receiving disgorgement of his own
overpayments.272  Where this damage limitation applies, several
district courts have held that the value of each class member’s
claim is the amount of his own overpayments.273  In other words,
the value of a restitution class member’s claim is not the value of
class-wide relief, nor a pro rata share of the profits to be dis-
gorged, but the amount of money he would have received had he
sued on his own.
V
OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE CURRENT STATE OF CLAIM
VALUATION, AS VIEWED FROM THE RULE OF
INDIVIDUAL VALUATION
The previous three Parts of this Article described and analyzed
three specific aspects of class action common relief claim valua-
tion.  Part II showed how federal courts have rejected aggregate
valuation based on the group nature of relief.  Part III set forth
the various methods courts have developed to calculate “per
class member” values for common relief claims.  And Part IV
tested those methods to see if they attributed to individual class
members the same amount in controversy they would have been
able to claim as solo litigants.  Part IV ultimately concluded that
271 Id.  at 720 n.19.
272 See supra  notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
273 See  McCoy v. Erie Ins. Co., 147 F. Supp. 2d 481, 491 (S.D. W. Va. 2001); Aetna
U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1050 (D.
Kan. 1999).
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some of the current valuation methods satisfied the rule of indi-
vidual valuation while others—most notably pro rata valuation—
did not.
In this Part, the Article shifts focus and asks what, if anything,
the rule of individual valuation teaches us about the current state
of claim valuation.  I suggest that the rule of individual valuation
approach offers two main lessons.  First, it demonstrates that the
courts are making some mistakes that almost certainly are de-
priving some litigants of at least the choice of the federal forum.
How great that impact is, however, we cannot state precisely be-
cause of uncertainties regarding claim valuation for single plain-
tiffs.  That is the second, and perhaps more important, insight
from the rule of individual valuation—that some of the most vex-
ing class action common relief valuation issues ultimately stem
not from the class action structure but from more fundamental
unresolved valuation questions.  In other words, strip away the
class context and you find single plaintiff valuation problems
bubbling underneath.
A. The Jurisdictional Penalty Imposed by Pro Rata Valuation
The most significant mistake courts make when valuing class
claims for common relief is to prorate punitive damages and at-
torneys’ fees.  Courts that prorate common relief claims commit
the cardinal sin of claim valuation:  They allow joinder to affect
jurisdiction.274  The fundamental principle expressed in Snyder  is
that jurisdiction is determined independently of joinder.275  In
Snyder , the Court applied that principle to hold that a collection
of “small” cases did not add up to one “big” group case.  When a
court prorates, however, it conflates joinder and jurisdiction in
the opposite direction—it concludes that the individual cases are
“small” by dividing the value of the “big” group case.  As dis-
cussed previously, however, there is no linear relationship be-
tween the number of plaintiffs in a suit and the size of punitive
damage awards276 or attorneys’ fee awards.277  The net effect,
then, is that prorating imposes a jurisdictional penalty on class
actions.
274 See FED. R. CIV. P. 82 (“These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit
the jurisdiction of the United States district courts.”).
275 Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 338-39 (1969).
276 See supra  notes 241-43 and accompanying text.
277 See supra  notes 249-50 and accompanying text.
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The pro rata penalty might manifest itself in several different
ways.  First, and most simply, all of the class members may be
found—under the rule of individual valuation—to individually
satisfy the amount in controversy requirement.278  Alternatively,
the rule of individual valuation might lead to the result that some
of the class members satisfy the amount in controversy while
others do not.  Under the rule established in Zahn , the federal
courts would accept jurisdiction over the plaintiffs who met the
jurisdictional amount and dismiss the others.279  At that point,
the court would proceed to determine whether the rule-based re-
quirements for class adjudication—including numerosity—were
met.280
The rule of individual valuation could have its most dramatic
impact, however, in jurisdictions that deem the supplemental ju-
risdiction statute to have overruled Zahn .  In those circuits, a sin-
gle jurisdictionally-sufficient class member can serve as the
jurisdictional anchor for the entire class.281  The natural, perhaps
unavoidable, consequence of a valuation scheme that focuses on
individuals rather than averages is that it will identify the ex-
tremes.  In other words, whereas a pro rata valuation scheme
might bury the one class member whose individual entitlements
to common relief forms would meet the jurisdictional amount, an
individual valuation scheme will expose him.282  In this regard,
278 Many prominent federal court class actions involving mass torts have predi-
cated diversity jurisdiction on the value of each class member’s individual damages.
The trial court in the Amchen  case, for example, found that each class member’s
individual compensatory and punitive damages exceeded the jurisdictional
amount—even those class members who had been exposed to asbestos but were not
yet injured. See  Carlough v. Amchen Prods., Inc. , 834 F. Supp. 1437, 1457-62 (E.D.
Pa. 1993).  While the Supreme Court expressed some doubt about this finding as to
the “exposure only” class members, it did not reach the issue. See  Amchen Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 n.15 (1997).  Individual damages have satisfied the
amount in controversy requirement in non-tort contexts as well. See , e.g. , Hawkins
v. Aid Ass’n for Lutherans, 338 F.3d 801, 805 (7th Cir. 2003) (policy values in insur-
ance class action exceeded the requisite amount in controversy).
279 See  Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973).
280 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (setting forth class codification requirements).
281 See , e.g. , Louque v. Allstate Ins. Co., 314 F.3d 776, 782 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding
that lead plaintiff stated a claim in excess of $75,000 and asserting supplemental
jurisdiction over the rest of the class members).
282 It bears noting, however, that the existence of a high dollar unnamed  class
member will not support supplemental jurisdiction, since courts look only to the lead
plaintiffs in applying § 1367. See  5 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra  note 69,
§ 23.07[3][c][ii] (“[T]he statute does not permit supplemental jurisdiction over a
class action in which unnamed  class members meet the amount in controversy re-
quirement, but the named plaintiff does not.”); see , e.g. , Gibson v. Chrysler Corp.,
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the rule of individual valuation may appear to some as a stalking
horse for supplemental jurisdiction.
Very little can be said, however, about how substantially the
rule of individual valuation would actually impact the federal
class action docket.283  Ironically, the source of the uncertainty is
that individual valuation itself is plagued by vexing valuation
questions.  The valuation of punitive damages, for example, re-
mains a quagmire.  In State Farm , the Supreme Court purported
to presumptively cap the ratio of punitive to compensatory dam-
ages at ten to one.284  Thus, it could be that individually-valued
punitive damages might exceed prorated punitive damages by a
factor of ten.285  But because the ratio cap is not firm, courts can
only guess at when the Supreme Court might permit higher ra-
tios.  To the extent that the legal certainty test still controls the
valuation of an individual plaintiff’s punitive damages claim,
courts still face a daunting task of determining just how much a
plaintiff could recover within the limits of state law and due pro-
cess.  If that was not enough, unanswered questions remain re-
garding the viability of “total harm” punitive damages—which
261 F.3d 927, 940-41 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting argument that court may use supple-
mental jurisdiction based on jurisdictionally-sufficient claim of class member who as
not designated as a named plaintiff); In re  Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust
Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 607 (7th Cir. 1997) (“At least one named plaintiff must satisfy
the jurisdictional minimum.”).
283 The rule of individual valuation, of course, also would impact the process by
which federal judges value class actions.  One salutary effect is that it would stand-
ardize claim valuation, since federal courts already value compensatory damages for
individual class members separately. See  Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 590
(1939) (dismissing “for want of the jurisdictional amount as to all of the appellees
except Paul Gray, Inc.,” which established that it sought a sufficient amount in con-
troversy); see also  Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 334 (1969) (non-aggregated value
of class members compensatory claims was their personal losses of $8,740 in one
case and $7.81 in the other).  Indeed, for compensatory damages, pro rata valuing is
dismissed as “simplistic averaging.”  Agre v. Rain & Hall LLC, 196 F. Supp. 2d 905,
908 (D. Minn. 2002) (proffering “aggregated-sum-divided-by-the-number-of-plain-
tiffs theory does not establish . . . that each individual plaintiff’s insurable contract
losses were in excess of $75,000”).  Understandably, one might be concerned that
replacing pro rata valuation with individual valuation would increase the court’s
workload.  In most cases, however, the courts should be able to use wholesale esti-
mates to determine whether a more detailed analysis is required, as a few calcula-
tions may quickly rule out the ability of the class members to individually meet the
amount in controversy or establish that they do meet it.  Where the outcome is in
doubt, courts will face a tougher task, though, as shown above, it is one they already
bear for compensatory damages.
284 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1524 (2003).
285 See supra  notes 241-53 and accompanying text.
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State Farm  does not explicitly foreclose—and how cumulative
punitive damages awards impact future claimants.
Similar uncertainties bedevil attorneys’ fee awards (where they
still count286).  Courts face no easy task in determining how much
a reasonable fee would be in any particular case.  If courts take
the legal certainty test seriously, individually-valued fee awards
could be far greater than prorated fee awards, owing to the econ-
omies of scale of group litigation.287  Again, however, questions
regarding single-plaintiff claim valuation prevent us from know-
ing more about the actual disparity, which in turn preclude spe-
cific conclusions regarding how many cases that fail the
jurisdictional amount when prorated would satisfy it under the
rule of individual valuation.
B. The Real Problem with Valuing Class Claims for Injunctive
Relief and Restitution
One of the more surprising findings of this Article is that, for
the most part, courts already conform to the rule of individual
valuation for injunctive relief and restitution.  Whether they
value injunctive relief from the plaintiff’s perspective or the de-
fendant’s perspective, the end result is that courts try to value the
injunction based on benefit to or cost associated with individual
class members.288  And, when courts value restitution claims that
seek disgorgement, they do so based on what class members
could obtain individually.289  Nevertheless, the case law evi-
dences considerable turmoil because of unsettled questions that
relate to single-plaintiff equitable claim valuation.
First, the rule of individual valuation highlights some funda-
mental questions regarding the value of injunctive relief.  The
question that has received the most attention lately has been
whether injunctive relief may be valued based on the cost to the
defendant, rather than just the benefit to the plaintiff.  The Su-
preme Court had taken certiorari on that issue, but dismissed the
writ as improvidently granted.290  What makes that question so
important, however, is a subsidiary unresolved valuation issue—
286 See  Hart v. Schering-Plough Corp., 253 F.3d 272, 274 (7th Cir. 2001) (counting
only fees incurred prior to suit towards the amount in controversy).
287 See supra  notes 249-50 and accompanying text.
288 See supra  notes 169-92 and accompanying text.
289 See supra  notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
290 See supra  note 53 (discussing dismissal of writ of certiorari as improvidently
granted in Ford Motor Co. v. McCauley).
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whether the defendant’s costs include the oftentimes enormous
internal costs it incurrs in order to comply externally with the
injunction.
The existing class action cases demonstrate that the courts do
not fully appreciate the source of the problem.  To date, the
courts have viewed the enormity of the defendant’s compliance
costs as a de facto aggregation problem.  In response, a few
courts have prorated the defendant’s costs.291 The Seventh and
Ninth Circuits, however, responded by implicitly adopting the
rule of individual valuation: They calculate the amount in contro-
versy based not on the defendant’s cost to comply with a class-
wide injunction, but on what it would cost to comply with an in-
junction running to a single plaintiff.292  In so doing, however,
they created a potentially gaping entry into federal court because
the defendants argued that, given the nature of the injunctions
requested, it would cost them millions to comply with the injunc-
tion even if it ran only to a single plaintiff.  The Seventh and
Ninth Circuits both responded by excluding what they termed
the defendant’s internal compliance costs from the amount in
controversy calculation.293
Were these courts to explicitly approach the problem from the
rule of individual valuation, they would see that there is only one
relevant question:  Does the amount in controversy under § 1332
ever  include the indirect costs a defendant incurs in order to put
itself in a position to give any  plaintiff what he wants?  To the
extent that internal costs count in a single plaintiff suit, then the
rule of individual valuation would include those same costs in the
value of each class member’s claim.  It goes without saying that,
under the rule of individual valuation, a great number of class
actions would qualify for diversity jurisdiction were the Supreme
Court to allow defendant-viewpoint valuation and define costs in
a way that includes internal compliance costs.  The amount in
controversy would be met for each class member any time a de-
fendant could show that it would incur more than $75,000 of in-
ternal expense in order to put itself in a position to begin
complying with the requested court order, even if the subsequent
291 See supra  cases cited in note 183.
292 See In re  Ford Motor Co./Citibank (S.D.), 264 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2001); In
re  Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 610 (7th Cir.
1997).
293 See In re Ford , 264 F.3d at 961; In re Brand Name Drugs , 123 F.3d at 610
(asserting in dicta).
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cost that it incurred each time it actually complied with the order
to benefit a class member was minimal.
Class action restitution claims also harbor crucial and un-
resolved single-plaintiff valuation questions.  Many class actions
seek restitution—at least in the sense that they ask the court to
order that a defendant who has unjustly profited from wrongdo-
ing will be made to disgorge the ill-gotten gains.294  Some states
appear not only to permit this remedy, but to allow a single
plaintiff to recover the full amount of the defendant’s ill-gotten
gains.295  In this situation, the rule of individual valuation would
attribute the full value of the restitution claim to each class mem-
ber.  And since a defendant who is the target of a class suit is
likely to have pocketed more than $75,000 in overall ill-gotten
gains, the practical result is that when a class invokes this type of
restitution claim, each class member will satisfy the amount in
controversy requirement based on the restitution claim alone.
All of this assumes, however, that the applicable state law al-
lows a single victim to receive a disgorgement of the full amount
of the defendant’s ill-gotten gains.  This type of remedy is com-
mon in federal securities cases prosecuted by the federal govern-
ment.296  According to one commentator, however, full
disgorgement orders are available only to public enforcement
agencies rather than as a private remedy for civil litigants.297
Thus, it may be that most states limit a single plaintiff to a “dis-
gorgement” of his own losses.  While a court might call that rem-
edy restitution, it is in reality nothing more than compensatory
damages298 and ought to be valued as such.
294 While many might argue that the courts are conflating restitution, unjust en-
richment, and disgorgement, see supra  footnote 135 and materials cited therein, a
federal court may not disregard a state remedy because it thinks it is misguided or
mistaken.
295 See supra  notes 270-71 and accompanying text.
296 “In the exercise of its equity powers, a district court may order the disgorge-
ment of profits acquired through securities fraud.”  S.E.C. v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 139
(2d Cir. 1995).  Because the purpose of the disgorgement order is to deter securities
fraud by depriving violators of their ill-gotten gains, the violator must disgorge the
full amount of those gains. See  S.E.C. v. Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d 170, 175-76 (2d
Cir. 1997).  While the SEC may allocate disgorged profits to victim compensation,
the disgorgement power itself is not tied to or limited by the victim’s actual losses.
Id.  at 176.
297 See JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES 334 (1999).
298 See  Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution , 67 TEX. L.
REV. 1277, 1282 (1989).
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VI
CLASS ACTION VALUATION AND
JURISDICTIONAL REFORM
The rule of individual valuation would change the number of
class actions that, through the pursuit of common relief, could
satisfy the amount in controversy requirement for diversity juris-
diction.  As discussed above, thorny questions about how those
common relief claims are valued even when brought by single
plaintiffs make it very hard to say what the extent of that change
might be.  Two other considerations—both pertaining to jurisdic-
tional reform—further cloud the situation.  First, loopholes in the
existing removal framework have the potential to severely blunt
the impact of the rule of individual valuation.  Second, Congress
is actively considering comprehensive class action reform that
would explicitly displace the Snyder  non-aggregation rule and
value class actions based on the total amount of relief claimed by
the class.
A. Amount in Controversy and the Special Problems
of Removal
The rule of individual valuation would likely increase the num-
ber of class actions that could be brought  under diversity jurisdic-
tion.  Thus, to the extent that plaintiffs wish to pursue state law
class actions in federal court, the rule of individual valuation fa-
cilitates that goal.  The modern trend, however, is that plaintiffs
prefer the state court forum.  Thus, in most cases it will be the
defendant who seeks the federal forum by removing a class ac-
tion from state court.  As discussed below, removal presents spe-
cial problems for class action valuation.
The most basic problem results when plaintiffs’ counsel simply
omits all of the “high-dollar” claims from the state court com-
plaint, instead including only those that fall demonstrably short
of the jurisdictional amount on a per class member basis.  In
many cases, plaintiffs’ counsel may truly intend to forego the
omitted claims for strategic reasons, perhaps to ensure a state
forum or perhaps to facilitate class certification.299  In other
299 One practice guide, for example, recommends that plaintiffs in consumer cases
omit common law fraud claims because of the negative impact the issue of reliance
has on the predominance requirement under Rule 23(b)(2). See NATIONAL CON-
SUMER LAW CTR., CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS:  A PRACTICAL LITIGATION GUIDE
§ 1.5.3, at 16 (5th ed. 2002).
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cases, however, the omission is not a genuine waiver.  First, the
state in which the class action is pending may follow Rule
54(c)300 and allow the plaintiff to recover more in damages than
he or she asks for in the complaint.301  Thus, the omission does
not compromise ultimate recovery.  Second, plaintiffs’ counsel
may intend to amend his state law complaint after 365 days,
when the one-year period302 for removing diversity cases
expires.303
When class counsel omits claims entirely there is little a federal
court can do regarding the amount in controversy.  Nothing re-
quires a plaintiff to sue at all, let alone assert all of the claims he
might have.  And until potential claims are actually asserted, they
carry no jurisdictional consequence.304  Thus, claim omission—
particularly with the intent to amend after the removal period
expires—is something that at least some federal judges acknowl-
edge to be a problem but feel powerless to address directly.305
One judge addressed the problem indirectly, however, by grant-
ing remand but threatening sanctions if the plaintiffs later added
300 Rule 54(c) provides, in pertinent part, that “every final judgment shall grant
the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party
has not demanded such relief in the party’s pleadings .” FED. R. CIV. P. 54(c) (em-
phasis added).
301 14C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
§ 3725, 96 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter 14C FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE];
Russell P. Jessee, Note, Pleading to Stay in State Court:  Forum Control, Federal
Removal Jurisdiction, and the Amount in Controversy Requirement , 56 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 651, 664 (1999).
302 See  28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2000).
303 See Alice Noble-Allgire, Removal of Diversity Actions When the Amount in
Controversy Cannot Be Determined from the Face of Plaintiff’s Complaint:  The
Need for Judicial and Statutory Reform to Preserve Defendant’s Equal Access to Fed-
eral Courts , 62 MO. L. REV. 681, 732 (1997) (stating that one-year limit “can put the
defendant’s right to remove at the mercy of a dilatory or unscrupulous plaintiff”);
Jack E. Karns, Removal to Federal Court and the Jurisdictional Amount in Contro-
versy Pursuant to State Statutory Limitations on Pleading Damage Claims , 29
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1091, 1096 (1996) (noting that “a plaintiff could plead less than
the jurisdictional amount, wait for the one year period to expire, and amend the
complaint to include an amount in excess of the jurisdictional amount”).
304 Cf.  Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 810 n.6 (1986) (find-
ing no federal question jurisdiction despite existence of potential federal cause of
action because “[j]urisdiction may not be sustained on a theory that the plaintiff has
not advanced”).
305 Davis v. Carl Cannon Chevrolet-Olds, Inc., 182 F.3d 792, 799 (11th Cir. 1999)
(Nangle, J. concurring) (noting that while the lead plaintiffs were purporting to
waive all punitive damages, “the reality of the situation is that plaintiffs will likely
seek to amend their complaint and seek greater amounts of damages after the one
year removal window has closed”).
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the omitted claims.306
Class counsel who permanently waive class claims to stay
under the amount in controversy, however, may encounter dif-
ferent problems.  In one recent case, the Fifth Circuit simply dis-
regarded the purported class claim waiver as ineffective, based in
part on the conclusion that class counsel lacked authority to do
so from the absent class members who owned the claim.307  Simi-
larly, there is good cause to question whether a class action that
omits the class members’ most valuable claims can satisfy the ad-
equacy of representation prerequisite to class certification.308
A similar problem arises when class counsel asserts the poten-
tially “high-dollar” claims in state court but affirmatively values
them in the state court complaint at less than the jurisdictional
amount.  While the longstanding rule is that the plaintiff, as
master of his complaint, is free to seek less than the jurisdictional
amount in order to ensure a state court forum,309 many federal
courts give the defendant an opportunity to challenge the plain-
tiff’s state court ad damnum as a non-binding undervaluation.310
306 See  Mitchell v. Geico, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (M.D. Ala. 2000). This case in-
volved the value to place on punitive damages that the class could have sought but
did not.  The court accorded no jurisdictional value to potential punitive damages
based on class counsel’s assertion that the class would not later seek—or even ac-
cept—punitive damages upon remand to state court. Id.  at 1329.  It then stated that,
if the plaintiff’s counsel subsequently asserted a claim for punitive damages or ac-
cepted them even if not requested, sanctions against the lawyer would be “swift in
coming . . . and painful upon arrival.” Id.  at 1330.
307 See  Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins., Co., 276 F.3d 720, 724 (5th Cir.
2002) (including value of attorneys’ fee claim after finding that purported waiver of
claim was ineffective).  Other courts uphold unilateral claim waivers on the basis
that individual class members who wish to assert those claims may opt out and pur-
sue them individually. See  Cowan v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 67 F. Supp. 2d
1312, 1317 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (excluding value of waived punitive damages claim
based on absent class members’ opt out rights).
308 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
309 St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 294 (1938) (finding
that a plaintiff who “does not desire to try his case in federal court . . . may resort to
the expedient of suing for less than the jurisdictional amount.”).
310 See  15 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra  note 10, § 102.107[3]. In many
states, the plaintiff need not plead—and, in some states, may not plead—a specific
ad damnum (request for damages). See  Noble-Allgire, supra  note 303, at 686-87
(1997) (listing practices from various states); see generally  Karns, supra  note 303, at
1091.  In this situation, the prevailing rule in most federal courts is that, in order to
remove, the defendant must show by “a preponderance of the evidence” that the
value of the plaintiff’s claims exceeds the jurisdictional amount.  Martin v. Franklin
Capital Corp., 251 F.3d 1284, 1290 (10th Cir. 2001) (listing jurisdictions that had
adopted the preponderance test but holding that it need not decide); see also  14C
Federal Practice and Procedure, supra  note 301, § 3725, at 80-81 (discussing prepon-
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In the Fifth Circuit, for example, a defendant may remove a so-
called “lowball”311 state court complaint by showing by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the claim is large enough to surpass
the jurisdictional amount.312  If the defendant makes this show-
ing, the plaintiff can defeat removal only by showing that his re-
covery is legally certain to be less than the jurisdictional amount,
such as by filing a pre-removal binding waiver or by showing that
the state court ad damnum is both binding and not subject to
amendment.313
Recently, class counsel seeking to removal-proof their state
court class actions have started using a new tactic.  Instead of
omitting their high-dollar claims altogether, plaintiffs are assert-
ing them but positioning themselves below the jurisdictional
amount by “waiving” each class member’s potential relief above
$75,000.314  In doing so, they rely directly on St. Paul Mercury
Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co. , in which the Supreme Court
stated that a plaintiff who wants to remain in state court “may
derance standard); Noble-Allgire, supra  note 303, at 695-96 (discussing appellate
court decisions, and equating the preponderance standard with the “more likely
than not” standard adopted in several circuits); see generally  Jesse, supra  note 301,
at 679 (discussing the preponderance of the evidence standard).
311 See  Noble-Allgire, supra  note 303, at 697 (adopting this terminology).
312 See  De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1411 (5th Cir. 1995).  Other courts
have adopted a preponderance standard or its equivalent. See , e.g. , Rogers v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 230 F.3d 868, 871 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that where state law
does not limit plaintiff to the damages prayed for in the state law complaint, defen-
dant may remove by showing that it is “‘more likely than not that the plaintiff’s
claims meet the amount in controversy requirement”); In re  Diet Drugs Prods. Liab.
Litig., 2000 WL 556602, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2000) (adopting preponderance
standard and denying remand motion in Phen-Fen litigation).  In contrast, the Elev-
enth Circuit imposes a much higher standard, requiring the defendant to show that it
is legally certain that the plaintiff’s damages will exceed the jurisdictional amount.
See  Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994).
313 De Aguilar II , 47 F.3d at 1412; see also , e.g. , Jeffery v. Cross Country Bank,
131 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1070 (E.D. Wis. 2001) (remanding where plaintiff’s complaint
affirmatively disavowed a damage claim in excess of $75,000); Moore v. Toyota Mo-
tor Corp., 64 F. Supp. 2d 612, 614 (N.D. Miss. 1999) (remanding where plaintiff
stipulated that she was seeking less than $75,000 and that she would not amend her
ad damnum after the one-year diversity removal period expired).
314 See  John H. Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller, They’re Making a Federal Case
Out of It . . . in State Court , 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 148 (2001); see , e.g. ,
Cowan v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 67 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1316 (M.D. Ala. 1999)
(waiving all punitive damages, in addition to compensatory and other damages
above $74,000 for each class member); Hooks v. Assocs. Fin. Serv. Co., 966 F. Supp.
1098, 1099 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (waiving each class member’s recovery above $49,000);
see also , e.g. , Brooks v. Pre-Paid Legal Servs., Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1300 (M.D.
Ala. 2001) (waiving each plaintiff’s relief above $74,500).
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resort to the expedient of suing for less than the jurisdictional
amount, and though he would be justly entitled to more, the de-
fendant cannot remove.”315  Here too, the courts seem to be hon-
oring the supposed waiver and valuing each class member at that
amount.316
To the extent the courts continue to allow this type of maneu-
vering,317 defendants are effectively stripped of their ability to
remove diversity class actions.  While the actual distribution
method may vary somewhat, the class members will split up any
eventual recovery of overlapping forms of relief like punitive
damages.318  Knowing this, class counsel can discount the recov-
ery each class member purports to seek individually based on the
realities of group award distributions. For example, if class coun-
sel anticipates that the most that the defendant might have to pay
in punitive damages is $20 million, counsel can quickly calculate
that, for a 1,000 member class, the prorata payout  will be just
$20,000.  Thus, class counsel can comfortably “waive” each indi-
vidual’s claim  above $75,000 knowing that it will have no effect
on actual class member payout.319
315 St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 294 (1938).
316 See supra  cases cited in note 314. But see De Aguilar II , 47 F.3d at 1413 (disre-
garding “value waiver” in non-class action on basis that class counsel were not the
legal representatives of the real plaintiffs).
317 Snyder , of course, requires that the court value the class members individually.
And Red Cab  certainly holds that a court must recognize a single plaintiff’s volun-
tary waiver when valuing the jurisdictional amount.  But do either Snyder  or Red
Cab  require that the court accept value waivers in class actions?  One alternative
application of Red Cab  would be to accept value waivers only to the extent that the
remaining total of all parties’ relief did not exceed $75,000.  That application would
still honor the animating principle of Red Cab—to preserve the state forum for
plaintiffs willing to forego relief to get it—because individual class members, at least
in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, could still opt out, re-file in state court, and affirma-
tively waive relief above the jurisdictional amount in their single plaintiff suits.  It
would also honor Snyder  because it would not displace the requirement that each
plaintiff’s actual total claim value exceed the jurisdictional amount.  Its effect, then,
would be solely to prevent parties who individually could have received in excess of
$75,000 from joining together to collectively seek more than the jurisdictional
amount, while simultaneously disclaiming that any of them is individually seeking
the jurisdictional amount.
318 See  Hines, supra  note 237, at 924 (discussing variations in distribution of class-
wide punitive damages).
319 Looking at this from the other direction, class counsel can “waive” the
amounts above $75,000 and still seek enormous class-wide relief.  For example, in
the 1,000 member class action hypothesized above, class counsel can “waive” all
recovery above $75,000 per class member (for total damages) and still affirmatively
seek $75 million in total damages.
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B. Comprehensive Class Action Jurisdictional Reform
For the past several years, Congress has considered legislation
that would comprehensively reform class action jurisdiction in
federal court.320  In 2003, for example, bills titled the Class Ac-
tion Fairness Act were introduced in both the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate.321  The openly-avowed purpose of
these bills is to open the federal courts to a much greater range
and number of state law class actions.322  The bills accomplish
this primarily by expressly applying the minimal diversity stan-
dard to class actions323 and by using the aggregate value of class-
wide relief to determine the amount in controversy, with the ju-
320 In a related development, Congress recently expanded federal jurisdiction
over mass accident litigation via the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of
2002.  28 U.S.C. § 1369 (2000).  Like the comprehensive class action reform propos-
als discussed infra , it relies on minimal diversity and an altered amount in contro-
versy requirement to provide a federal forum for large scale litigation involving
citizens of different states.  It is far narrower in scope, however, as it covers only
cases arising out of a single accident and applies only where at least seventy-five
natural persons have died as a result.  28 U.S.C. § 1369(a) (2000).
321 See  Class Action Fairness Act of 2003, H.R. 1115, 108th Cong. (2003); Class
Action Fairness Act of 2003, S. 274, 108th Cong. (2003).  Similar bills passed the
House of Representatives in 1999 and 2002. See  H.R. 2341, 107th Cong. (2002);
H.R. 8595, 106th Cong. (1999).  For a discussion of the 1999 class action jurisdiction
bills, see Glenn A. Danas, Comment, The Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of
1999:  Another Attempt to Federalize State Law , 49 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1335-37 (2000);
Stephen D. Kaufmann, Comment, “Federalizing” Class Actions: The Future of the
Jurisdictional Requirements for Diversity-Based Class Actions , 52 ALA. L. REV.
1029, 1044-49 (2001) (discussing Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999 and
the Class Action Fairness Act of 1999, neither of which Congress enacted). It is
worth noting that this is not Congress’s first encounter with class action jurisdiction
bills, as several were introduced by plaintiff and consumer groups in the wake of
Snyder  and Zahn . See RAND/ICJ STUDY, supra  note 4, at 17 (discussing proposed
legislation); see generally  Leete, supra  note 5, at 46 (discussing the proposed but not
enacted Consumer Class Action Act); James E. Starrs, The Consumer Class Ac-
tion—Part II:  Considerations of Procedure , 49 B.U. L. REV. 407, 494 (1969) (same).
322 See  H.R. 1115 § 2(b)(3) (stating that purpose of the Act is “to restore the
intent of the framers of the Constitution by providing for Federal court considera-
tion of interstate class actions.”); S. 274 § 2(b)(2) (same); see also  Schwartz et al.,
supra  note 5, at 510-12 (discussing jurisdictional purpose of essentially identical pre-
vious bills).
323 See  H.R. 1115, § 4(a)(2)(A); S. 274 (4)(a)(2)(A).  In so doing, it effectively
gives defendants the same “minimal diversity option” that class plaintiffs enjoy as a
practical matter under Ben Hur . See  Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S.
356, 366 (1921) (holding that only named class members count towards determining
diversity of citizenship).  The bills contain exceptions, however, for cases in which
the “substantial majority” of class members are from the same state as the primary
defendant and in which the local state law would apply. See  H.R. 1115,
§ 4(a)(3)(A); S. 274 (4)(a)(3)(A).
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risdictional amount then set at five million dollars.324  The Class
Action Fairness Act bills also facilitate removal of class actions
by eliminating the one year time limit for removal of diversity
cases for class actions.325
It is apparent that a bill of this nature, if enacted, would sub-
stantially impact the amount in controversy issues that lie at the
core of this Article.  Quite obviously, courts need not fret over
how properly to value common relief on a per class member ba-
sis if Congress overrules Snyder  and institutes an aggregate value
test.326  By design, the bills would also address the valuation
problem caused by the one-year cap on diversity removal.  By
providence, the adoption of an aggregate value standard would
address the thorny problem of “value waiving.”327
Nevertheless, it remains important to proceed with the task at
hand.  If nothing else, it is far from certain that Congress will pass
comprehensive class action jurisdiction reform any time soon.328
Class action jurisdiction bills are controversial because of the be-
lief that, even at the seemingly high threshold of five million dol-
lars, they would sweep most “small claims” state law class actions
into federal court.329  The proponents argue that sweeping juris-
324 See  H.R. 1115 § 4(a)(4); S. 274 § 4(a)(4).
325 See  H.R. 1115 § 5(b); S. 274 § 5(b); see also  Schwartz et al., supra  note 5, at
513.  Incidentally, the same concern that plaintiffs were manipulating § 1446(b) led
to the proposal in the Federal Judicial Code Revision Project to eliminate the one
year cap on delayed removal in diversity cases and replace it with a new section, 28
U.S.C. § 1447(b), that would authorize district judges to remand diversity cases re-
moved after one year from initial filing “in the interest of justice.” See  American
Law Institute, Federal Judicial Code Revision Project § 1447(b), at 154 (Tentative
Draft No. 3, 1999).
326 Some judges might welcome passage of the bill if for no other reason than to
free them from Snyder ’s command that they calculate per class member jurisdic-
tional amounts at all.
327 See supra  notes 313-19 and accompanying text.  While aggregate valuation
does not foreclose class counsel from waiving the value of individual class member’s
claims, it severely limits the benefit of doing so because class counsel must then
waive enough value for every class member to get under two million dollars for the
class.
328 Similar bills have been introduced many times without enactment. See supra
note 321.
329 The Federal Judicial Center is completing work on a national survey of plain-
tiffs’ and defendants’ attorneys in class action litigation that examines, among other
things, why they had chosen the forum they did.  Although the report is not yet
finished, the initial data suggest that a sizable number of class actions involve
predominantly local class members and yield aggregate recoveries far below
$5,000,000.  Interview with Thomas E. Willging, Senior Researcher, Federal Judicial
Center, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 18, 2003).  While the eventual recovery does not
define the ex ante  amount in controversy, these data do call into question the com-
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dictional reform is the only way to remedy what they character-
ize as a system that rewards rampant forum shopping for the
state court judges most willing to abuse class action procedures
and choice of law.330  In that regard, the proponents of the com-
prehensive class action reform bills seek to regulate state court
class action practice by shrinking it and placing the class action
docket in the hands of federal judges who already follow what
the reformers believe to be the “better practice” (and who are
more readily subject to direct federal regulation).331  The oppo-
nents see this as an affront to federalism, in which Congress
would use the power of the conservative federal courts to sup-
press proconsumer and proplaintiff state practices.332
CONCLUSION
Whether a class action proceeds in state court or federal court
mon impression that most class actions would easily satisfy the proposed $5,000,000
aggreate amount in controversy requirement.
330 See  H.R. 1115 § 2(a)(4) (listing abuses that occur when “plaintiffs are able to
avoid litigating class actions in Federal court”).  As one critic asserts:
[c]lass action abuse flourishes because of the ease with which contingency
fee lawyers manipulate federal law to avoid federal courts and to have their
cases heard in more sympathetic state courts.  State courts often express
bias against out-of-state corporate defendants and fail to apply class action
certification standards as rigorously as federal courts do.
Schwartz et al., supra  note 5, at 484.  A related motivating factor is the need to
address the problem of “universal venue,” by which class counsel take advantage of
the existing personal jurisdiction and state-law venue rules to forum shop to find the
state courts that are the least rigorous in applying class action certification and set-
tlement standards. See  Beisner & Miller, supra  note 314, at 155; see also  Edward H.
Cooper, Federal Class Action Reform in the United States: Past and Future and Where
Next? , 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 432, 437 (2002).  While the federal court system has mech-
anisms for transferring and consolidating duplicative cases, see  28 U.S.C. § 1404
(2000) (change of venue statute); 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000) (multidistrict litigation
statute for pre-trial consolidation), there is no effective way to consolidate duplica-
tive class actions pending in the various state courts. See RAND/ICJ STUDY, supra
note 4, at 482-83 (discussing practical problems associated with competing class ac-
tions in state courts).
331 See  Proposed Amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (submitted to U.S. Supreme
Court in December 2002) (proposing changes that, among other things, would set
stricter requirements for approving class action settlements, including explicitly au-
thorizing federal judges to condition settlement approval on giving the class mem-
bers an opportunity to “opt-out” of the settlement itself).
332 See  Anderson, supra  note 4, at 347-51 (addressing ALI proposal that also
would shift class action docket from state court to federal court); Danas, supra  note
321, at 1305-06; see also  Robert Torricelli, Class Action Legislation: A View from the
U.S. Senate , 215 N.J. LAW. MAG. 9 (2002) (arguing that the pending class action
legislation “sweeps too broadly” and could “greatly hinder the ability of plaintiffs to
obtain any class action relief at all”).
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can have substantial consequences for certification, settlement,
and other important factors that straddle the line between man-
agement and merits.  One of the critical issues in determining
whether a class action can be filed in—or removed to—federal
court is how courts calculate the amount in controversy.  Under
the existing scheme, class actions must meet the general amount
in controversy requirements under § 1332, and courts are sup-
posed to calculate the amount in controversy in class actions in
the same way that they would calculate the amount in contro-
versy in non-class cases.  Thus, class members are valued as sepa-
rate individuals and may invoke the aggregate value of relief
sought only to the extent that they could have done so as non-
class litigants under the common and undivided interest rule.  In
short, joinder and class structure do not—or at least should not—
matter.
In practice, however, joinder and class structure do matter be-
cause the federal courts have adopted valuation techniques that
impose jurisdictional penalties on certain types of claims when
they are raised in a class action.  When courts prorate the value
of class action claims for punitive damages or attorneys’ fees,
they use simple division in a way that undervalues those claims
relative to what the value would be if the class members had sued
as solo plaintiffs.  In addition, some courts value equitable relief
like injunctions and restitution claims in ways that may fail to
credit each class member with the full jurisdictional value of
those claims.
At this point, it is unclear whether Congress, as part of an ef-
fort to reform class action litigation generally, will adopt a new
valuation model for class actions that is based on aggregate valu-
ation.  But, at least for now, class actions remain under the gen-
eral diversity jurisdiction rubric, and so it is imperative that
courts get it right.  The rule of individual valuation is crucial to
the existing diversity statute because it is the only valuation tech-
nique that accomplishes the result that the Supreme Court says
Congress intended—for individual class members to be valued
based on their own claims, no more and no less.  Valuation prin-
ciples (as well as removal loopholes) that prevent federal courts
from hearing class claims that, were they properly valued, would
satisfy the existing jurisdictional amount deprive deserving liti-
gants of the federal forum and serve only to fuel the cry that the
existing diversity rule misfires for all class actions.
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